Summary
The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed an interlocutory appeal concerning the denial of summary judgment in claims arising from the handling of a workers' compensation medical referral. The court reversed the denial as to the tort-of-outrage claim, holding that the evidence did not establish sufficiently extreme conduct, but affirmed the denial as to fraudulent suppression and fraudulent misrepresentation. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Barr presented substantial evidence that ITT's refusal to authorize pain-management treatment constituted the tort of outrage.
- Whether ITT owed Barr a duty to disclose its procedures for obtaining authorization for a referral to a pain specialist and whether Barr presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to submit fraudulent suppression to a jury.
- Whether the trial court's denial of summary judgment on Barr's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim should be affirmed when ITT presented no specific argument challenging that ruling.
Holdings
- Barr failed to present substantial evidence that ITT intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress through conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous to satisfy the tort of outrage. The refusal to authorize the referral, standing alone, did not meet the required threshold.
- Under the circumstances, ITT owed Barr a duty to disclose the procedures required to obtain authorization for a referral to a pain specialist.
- Barr presented evidence that, if accepted and believed by a jury, would constitute clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent suppression; therefore, summary judgment was properly denied on that claim.
- The denial of summary judgment on Barr's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim was affirmed because ITT offered no specific argument demonstrating error, and the court would not create or advance an argument for a party.
Key quotations
“There must be no genuine issue of material fact and 2) the movant must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (643)
“By extreme we refer to conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” (644)
“The refusal alone to authorize the referral, however, does not rise to the threshold of the outrageous behavior set out in McDonald.” (645)
“These factors, when considered together, weigh heavily in favor of Barr's claim that ITT owed her a duty to inform her of the proper manner in which to obtain a referral.” (647)
Factual background
Barr had a workers' compensation claim arising from a 1992 workplace injury, with future medical benefits left open after settlement. ITT, acting as Bruno's third-party workers' compensation administrator, authorized some treatment but repeatedly declined to authorize Barr's referral to a pain-management specialist because it claimed a referring or receiving physician had to telephone ITT, although ITT had not disclosed that unwritten requirement to Barr or her doctors. After Barr filed suit, ITT approved pain-management treatment, which eventually controlled her pain.
Procedural history
Barr sued ITT over its handling of authorization for pain-management treatment related to her workers' compensation injury. The trial court entered summary judgment for ITT on Barr's breach-of-contract, negligence and wantonness, fraud and deceit, and civil-conspiracy claims, but denied summary judgment on the tort-of-outrage, fraudulent-misrepresentation, and fraudulent-suppression claims. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted ITT's petition for a permissive interlocutory appeal, reversed as to the tort-of-outrage claim, affirmed as to the fraudulent-suppression and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims, and remanded.
Remand instructions
Remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion after reversal of the denial of summary judgment on the tort-of-outrage claim.