State v. Lupo

984 So. 2d 395 (Ala. 2007) · Supreme Court of Alabama · October 12, 2007 · No. 1050224

Summary

The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed a challenge to the Alabama Interior Design Consumer Protection Act, which restricted the practice of interior design to registered individuals. The court held that the Act was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable because its definition of interior design encompassed ordinary interior-decorating services, such as advising on paint colors, furnishings, and accessories. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's judgment declaring the Act unconstitutional.

Court
Supreme Court of Alabama
Writing for the Court
Smith, Justice; Cobb, Chief Justice; See, Justice; Lyons, Justice; Woodall, Justice; Stuart, Justice; Bolin, Justice; Murdock, Justice; Parker, Justice
Jurisdiction
Alabama
Decision date
October 12, 2007
Docket number
1050224
Procedural posture
The Alabama State Board of Registration for Interior Design appealed a Jefferson Circuit Court judgment declaring the Alabama Interior Design Consumer Protection Act unconstitutional.
Standard of review
De novo review of constitutional challenges to legislative enactments; legislative acts are presumed constitutional, and the challenger bears the burden of showing unconstitutionality.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
State of Alabama, by and through the Alabama State Board of Registration for Interior Design v. Diane Burnett Lupo
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

due processoverbreadth doctrinestatutory interpretationseverabilityconstitutional law

Practice areas

constitutional lawadministrative lawprofessional licensingstatutory interpretation

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Alabama Interior Design Consumer Protection Act was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable under Article I, §§ 6 and 13, of the Alabama Constitution because its definition of the practice of interior design restricted ordinary interior-decorating services.
  2. Whether the unconstitutional definition could be severed from the remainder of the Act under the Act's severability provision.

Holdings

  1. The Act's definition of the practice of interior design was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable because it restricted useful activities such as advising clients about paint, pillows, furnishings, and other decorative materials without a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, general welfare, public convenience, or general prosperity.
  2. The unconstitutional definition of the practice of interior design could not be severed from the remainder of the Act, so the Act in its entirety was unconstitutional.

Key quotations

We conclude, therefore, that the Act “'imposes restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the pursuit of useful activities'” and that those restrictions “'do not bear some substantial relation to the public health, safety, or morals, or to the general welfare, the public convenience, or to the general prosperity.'” (406)
Consequently, the objectionable portion cannot be severed, and the Act in its entirety is unconstitutional. (407)
The judgment of the trial court declaring Act No. 2001-660, Ala. Acts 2001, unconstitutional is affirmed. (407)

Factual background

Diane Burnett Lupo had worked as an interior decorator for more than 22 years, advising clients about paint colors, artwork, flooring, fabrics, furniture, and accessories. The Alabama State Board of Registration for Interior Design determined that she was practicing interior design without a certificate of registration, imposed a $1,500 fine plus $235 in costs, and ordered her to cease the unregistered practice. The challenged Act defined the practice of interior design broadly enough to include advice about paint colors and decorative accessories, while exempting similar services when performed pursuant to a retail sale.

Procedural history

The Board sued Lupo to enforce a $1,500 administrative fine and costs and to enjoin her from practicing interior design without registration. After a nonjury trial, the Jefferson Circuit Court held the Act overly broad, unreasonable, and vague under the due-process provisions of the Alabama Constitution and enjoined enforcement. The circuit court denied the Board's postjudgment motion, and the Board timely appealed.

Court Document

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