Summary
The Alabama Supreme Court grants a police officer’s petition for a writ of mandamus and directs the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter summary judgment in his favor. The court holds that the officer made a prima facie showing of State-agent immunity and statutory peace-officer immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a), and that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence establishing an applicable exception. The claims arose from injuries and deaths resulting from a fleeing driver’s collision after a police pursuit.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the denial of Officer Brown's summary-judgment motion based on immunity was reviewable by mandamus.
- Whether Officer Brown made a prima facie showing that he was entitled to State-agent immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a).
- Whether Cupps presented substantial evidence that Brown acted beyond his authority by violating detailed pursuit rules or regulations.
- Whether Cupps presented substantial evidence that Brown violated Ala. Code § 32-5A-7 by acting without due regard for the safety of others or with reckless disregard.
- Whether Cupps presented substantial evidence that Brown's conduct proximately caused the collision and resulting injuries.
Holdings
- A police officer is entitled to State-agent immunity when the alleged tortious conduct occurred while the officer was performing a discretionary law-enforcement function within the line and scope of employment, unless the plaintiff presents substantial evidence establishing an applicable immunity exception.
- A police-department pursuit policy that establishes guidelines while leaving significant discretion to the officer or supervisor is not a set of detailed rules or regulations whose violation would establish that the officer acted beyond his authority for purposes of defeating State-agent immunity.
- Cupps did not present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that Brown acted without due regard for safety, with reckless disregard, or as the proximate cause of the collision; Mitchell's conduct was the proximate cause of the injuries.
Key quotations
“When a defendant raises the defense of State-agent immunity, the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that he or she qualifies for State-agent immunity. If the defendant satisfies that burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that, one of two exceptions to State-agent immunity, is applicable.” (503)
“Because the policy provides that the procedure for all pursuits is subject to an officer’s or the officer’s supervisor’s exercise of discretion with the safety of innocent parties being the primary focus, the policy and procedure constitute guidelines, not “detailed rules and regulations, such as those stated on a checklist” that must be followed by an officer.” (506)
“The mere fact that a police officer exceeds the maximum speed limit during a pursuit, ... does not present a genuine issue of material fact as to the liability of that officer for negligence.” (509)
Factual background
Officer Brandon Brown, a Fultondale police officer, pursued a blue Mitsubishi Eclipse whose occupants were suspected of theft. Brown ended the pursuit after being directed to do so by a supervisor, but he continued to observe the vehicle, which then ran a red light and struck a vehicle driven by Pamela Cupps, killing her and injuring David Cupps. Cupps alleged that Brown negligently or wantonly pursued the vehicle, violated the police department's pursuit policy, and violated Ala. Code § 32-5A-7.
Procedural history
Allison Cupps, as administrator of the estates of David and Pamela Cupps, sued Officer Brown and others after a vehicle pursued by Brown collided with the Cuppses' vehicle. Brown moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338 and the State-agent-immunity doctrine. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the motion, and Brown sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of Alabama.
Remand instructions
The Supreme Court directed the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Brown's summary-judgment motion and to enter summary judgment in Brown's favor.