Summary
The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the termination of D.J.'s parental rights in connection with P.C.'s petition to adopt the child. The court affirmed summary judgment on state-law grounds but held that the superior court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act's requirements concerning active remedial efforts and proof beyond a reasonable doubt supported by qualified expert testimony. The termination was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Act.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the superior court committed plain error by failing to extend the deadline for D.J. to respond to P.C.'s summary-judgment motion.
- Whether summary judgment was proper on the issues of whether D.J. unreasonably withheld consent to P.C.'s adoption and whether the adoption was in J.'s best interests.
- Whether the Indian Child Welfare Act applied to the termination of D.J.'s parental rights even though P.C. was an Indian custodian.
- Whether the superior court satisfied ICWA's active-efforts, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, and qualified-expert-testimony requirements before terminating D.J.'s parental rights.
Holdings
- The superior court's failure to extend the summary-judgment response deadline sua sponte was not plain error.
- Summary judgment was proper because D.J. failed to produce admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether his refusal to consent was reasonable or whether the adoption was in J.'s best interests.
- ICWA applies to termination proceedings when a party other than the state seeks termination, even when that party is an Indian custodian under ICWA.
- The superior court did not satisfy § 1912(f) because it did not determine, on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt including qualified expert testimony, whether continued legal custody by D.J. was likely to cause serious emotional or physical damage to J.
- A parent's incarceration may diminish the level of active efforts required under ICWA, but it does not eliminate the active-efforts requirement.
Key quotations
“In summary judgment cases, if the movant shows that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the established facts, the non-moving party must demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists.” (36 P.3d at 669)
“We hold that ICWA applies to termination proceedings when a party other than the state seeks the termination, even when that party is an "Indian custodian" under ICWA.” (36 P.3d at 673)
“However, incarceration does not eliminate the active efforts requirement of ICWA.” (36 P.3d at 673)
Factual background
J. was an Indian child because his mother and father were members of federally recognized tribes. J.'s mother placed him with his maternal grandmother, P.C., in 1995, and P.C. provided his exclusive care thereafter. D.J. had never lived with J., had never exercised unsupervised custody, and was incarcerated under a twenty-year sentence for attempted murder. P.C. sought to adopt J.; D.J. refused consent and alleged, without supporting admissible evidence, that P.C.'s husband was an alcoholic and sexual predator.
Procedural history
P.C. petitioned to adopt J. and moved for summary judgment, arguing that D.J.'s consent was unnecessary and that his parental rights could be terminated under Alaska law and the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court granted summary judgment, terminated D.J.'s parental rights, and later proceeded with the adoption hearing. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment ruling on state-law grounds but reversed the termination because the superior court failed to apply ICWA's requirements correctly.
Remand instructions
The superior court must conduct further proceedings consistent with ICWA, including applying § 1912(d) and § 1912(f), making findings regarding active efforts and their unsuccessful result, and determining—using the required beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and qualified expert testimony—whether continued legal custody by D.J. is likely to cause serious emotional or physical damage to J.