Municipality of Anchorage and Marc Woodward v. Theresa A. (Wimer) Gregg

Summary

The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the Municipality of Anchorage violated Theresa Gregg's rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act by denying protected leave for a serious health condition involving pregnancy, accident-related injuries, and severe emotional stress. The court affirmed the finding of FMLA liability and the wrongful-termination determination, while correcting errors in the damages calculation. It remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment and postjudgment interest and liquidated damages.

Holdings

1. An employee may establish FMLA incapacity through competent medical evidence considered by the fact-finder; the FMLA does not require a contemporaneous diagnosis that the employee was unable to work at every relevant point. Gregg's combined pregnancy, accident injuries, and psychological stress supported the superior court's finding that she was incapacitated and unable to perform police duties.
2. An employee who has a qualifying period of incapacity relating to the same conditions need not obtain additional medical treatment during the later period of incapacity in order to remain protected by the FMLA, where the employee previously received the required treatment.
3. For unforeseeable leave, an employee need not expressly invoke the FMLA; notice is sufficient when the information provided reasonably apprises the employer that the employee needs time off for a serious health condition. Gregg's communications and the Municipality's knowledge of her circumstances satisfied that standard.
4. The superior court did not clearly err in finding that Gregg was constructively discharged when she was effectively forced to resign or return to work despite a qualifying need for protected leave and the risk that termination would damage her law-enforcement certification.
5. Because Gregg's damages arose principally from the FMLA, federal law governed the compensatory interest award. Prejudgment interest was within the trial court's discretion, but postjudgment interest had to begin on entry of final judgment and use the rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
6. Liquidated damages under the FMLA are required unless the employer proves both that its violation was in good faith and that it had reasonable grounds for believing its conduct was lawful. The superior court's finding that the supervisor lacked knowledge of the FMLA did not satisfy those requirements, so the issue had to be reconsidered on remand.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Gregg had a serious health condition and period of incapacity qualifying her for FMLA leave.
2. Whether Gregg satisfied the FMLA continuing-treatment requirement despite receiving treatment primarily in January and not obtaining additional treatment in April.
3. Whether Gregg gave adequate notice of her need for FMLA leave without expressly invoking the statute.
4. Whether the Municipality had already provided the full amount of FMLA leave available to Gregg.
5. Whether the superior court clearly erred in finding that Gregg was constructively discharged and in crediting her testimony.
6. Whether federal law governed the calculation of prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the FMLA award.
7. Whether the superior court adequately determined whether the Municipality acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds to avoid liquidated damages.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded