State of Arizona v. Doris Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570

Summary

The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed Doris Carlson's convictions and death sentence for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and first-degree burglary. The court considered whether adverse publicity concerning defense counsel required striking the jury panel and reviewed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances supporting the death sentence. The court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to strike the jury panel.

Holdings

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the entire jury panel. The publicity concerned defense counsel rather than Carlson or the pending case, and the record did not establish presumed or actual prejudice among the jurors who served.
2. Arizona's constitutional right to an impartial jury is coextensive with the Sixth Amendment for purposes of the pretrial-publicity issue presented.
3. The evidence supported both the aggravator for procuring the murder by promise of payment under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(4) and the aggravator for committing the murder in expectation of pecuniary gain under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5). The two aggravators could both be found, although the closely related facts could not receive full independent weight twice.
4. The cruelty component of the (F)(6) aggravator was not established because Carlson neither intended that Lynne suffer nor knew that the planned method of murder would be reasonably certain to cause suffering.
5. The heinousness and depravity component of the (F)(6) aggravator was not established. Helplessness, familial relationship, and unsupported findings of mutilation and senselessness did not constitutionally establish that this murder was especially heinous or depraved.
6. After independently reweighing the remaining aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court concluded that the mitigation created sufficient doubt about the appropriateness of death and reduced the sentence to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Questions Presented

1. Whether pretrial publicity and prospective jurors' discussion of defense counsel's alleged sexual conduct required striking the entire jury panel or otherwise warranted reversal.
2. Whether Arizona's constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury provides broader protection than the Sixth Amendment in the context of pretrial publicity.
3. Whether the pecuniary-gain aggravators under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(4) and (F)(5) were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and could both be considered in sentencing.
4. Whether the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravator under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) applied to an accomplice who did not intend or know that the victim would suffer.
5. Whether the mitigating evidence, including duress, brain damage, lack of criminal history, and disparity between accomplice sentences, warranted reducing the death sentence.

Disposition

other