State of Arizona v. Danny N. Montano, 206 Ariz. 296

Summary

The Supreme Court of Arizona considered whether a Sixth Amendment violation under Ring v. Arizona was harmless in Danny N. Montano's capital sentencing. The court held that the especially cruel aggravating circumstance was not established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the mitigation evidence could have affected the sentencing outcome. It vacated Montano's death sentence and remanded for resentencing under amended Arizona capital sentencing statutes.

Holdings

1. A Sixth Amendment Ring error in a capital sentencing proceeding may be reviewed for harmless error, and the error is harmless only if the court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the sentencing outcome.
2. The Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine the prior-conviction aggravating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13-703.F.1 and F.2; the trial judge's finding of the prior serious-conviction aggravator was not disturbed.
3. The in-custody aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703.F.7 was established beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. The especially cruel aggravating circumstance was not established beyond a reasonable doubt for harmless-error purposes because a reasonable jury could find that Jackson lost consciousness before the stabbing and therefore did not consciously experience the required pain.
5. The Sixth Amendment error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because a reasonable jury could have credited the defense expert testimony, found one or more mitigating circumstances, weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently, or concluded that the mitigation was sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
6. The court did not need to decide whether the existing record entitled Montano to mental-retardation testing because A.R.S. § 13-703.02 would apply at his resentencing proceeding.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Sixth Amendment violation resulting from judicial, rather than jury, determination of capital-sentencing facts was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the prior-conviction aggravating circumstances and the in-custody aggravating circumstance could remain established without a jury determination.
3. Whether the especially cruel aggravating circumstance was established beyond a reasonable doubt despite evidence that Jackson may have lost consciousness before the stabbing.
4. Whether the mitigation evidence created reasonable doubt that a jury would have reached the same sentencing result.
5. Whether Montano was entitled in this proceeding to testing for mental retardation under A.R.S. § 13-703.02.

Disposition

vacated