Summary
The Supreme Court of Arizona reviews Tracy Allen Hampton’s convictions for two murders and fetal manslaughter and his death sentences. The court addresses issues including admission of victim photographs, applicability of Arizona’s fetal manslaughter statute, capital sentencing procedures after Ring v. Arizona, jury instructions for the heinous-or-depraved aggravator, and penalty-phase evidence. The court holds that the fetal manslaughter statute applies when both the mother and fetus die and declines to consider the (F)(6) aggravator because the jury instructions were constitutionally insufficient.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether death qualification of the guilt-phase jury was constitutional when a separate jury later determined aggravating circumstances and punishment.
- Whether photographs of the victims and fetus were properly admitted.
- Whether Arizona's fetal-manslaughter statute applies when both the mother and fetus die.
- Whether applying the post-Ring capital sentencing statutes violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses or Arizona's nonretroactivity statute.
- Whether the absence of probable-cause findings concerning capital aggravators invalidated the death sentences.
- Whether post-conviction notice of aggravating circumstances violated Arizona law or constitutional rights.
- Whether use of a second jury for aggravation and penalty violated Hampton's rights.
- Whether the sentencing proceedings violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses.
- Whether the facially vague especially-heinous-or-depraved aggravator was constitutionally applied through the jury instructions.
- Whether exclusion of portions of Hampton's mental-health expert testimony violated the Eighth Amendment.
- Whether admission of prior violent-acts testimony and hearsay in the penalty phase violated Arizona law or due process.
- Whether Arizona's death-penalty scheme improperly presumed death or placed an unconstitutional burden on Hampton concerning mitigation.
- Whether sympathy and prejudice instructions and victim-impact evidence were improper.
- Whether consecutive sentencing for fetal manslaughter violated A.R.S. § 13-116.
- Whether the aggravated manslaughter sentence violated Blakely v. Washington.
Holdings
- Death qualification of a guilt-phase jury is constitutional even when a different jury later determines aggravating circumstances and punishment, and the guilt-phase jury was not misled because it had no sentencing role.
- A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(5) applies when a defendant's conduct kills both a pregnant woman and her unborn child; fetal manslaughter is not subsumed in the mother's homicide.
- Application of the amended Arizona capital-sentencing statutes to Hampton's case did not violate the federal or state Ex Post Facto Clauses or A.R.S. § 1-244.
- The State's filing of notice of aggravating factors five days after conviction did not violate Arizona law or Hampton's due-process, effective-assistance, or fair-sentencing rights because he received notice eight months before the aggravation phase and claimed no prejudice.
- The jury instructions inadequately narrowed the relishing component of the facially vague (F)(6) aggravator because they did not require focus on the defendant's mental state at or near the time of the murder and did not explain the limited significance of post-murder conduct. The court therefore disregarded the (F)(6) aggravator in reviewing the death sentences.
- The admission of prior violent-acts testimony and related hearsay in the penalty phase did not violate Arizona law or due process because the evidence was relevant to rebut mitigation, Hampton had notice and an opportunity to respond, and the hearsay had sufficient indicia of reliability.
- A.R.S. § 13-116 does not bar consecutive sentences when a single act harms multiple victims; the fetal-manslaughter sentence could run consecutively to the sentences for the two murders.
- Any Blakely error in the judge's use of aggravating facts to impose Hampton's twelve-and-one-half-year manslaughter sentence was harmless because no reasonable jury could have failed to find at least two aggravating factors supported by the trial evidence.
- After disregarding the improperly instructed (F)(6) aggravator, the remaining (F)(8) multiple-homicides aggravator was established as to both murder convictions, and Hampton's mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency; the death sentences were therefore upheld.
Key quotations
“The statute, although perhaps not worded felicitously, applies when the acts and mental state of the defendant would support a murder charge in the event the mother died, whether or not she actually does.” (213 Ariz. at 176)
“The instructions given in this case, however, did not follow our previous decisions and allowed the jury to find the (F)(6) aggravator on the basis of "relishing" that may have occurred months after the crime.” (213 Ariz. at 186)
“Because the multiple homicides aggravator is of extraordinary weight, we find that the mitigation evidence is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and uphold the death sentences.” (213 Ariz. at 206)
Factual background
Hampton shot Charles Findley in the forehead at a Phoenix residence after an argument and then shot Findley's pregnant girlfriend, Tanya Ramsdell, while she slept. Ramsdell and her unborn child died. Evidence included eyewitness testimony, Hampton's statements to a cellmate, and testimony concerning his conduct and statements after the killings. Hampton presented substantial mitigation concerning his abusive and unstable childhood, mental-health problems, substance abuse, and family history.
Procedural history
A jury convicted Hampton of murdering Charles Findley and Tanya Ramsdell and of manslaughter for causing the death of Ramsdell's unborn child. After Ring v. Arizona required jury findings on capital aggravating circumstances, a new jury found aggravators and determined that mitigation did not warrant leniency. The superior court imposed two death sentences and a consecutive twelve-and-one-half-year manslaughter sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences after addressing Hampton's eighteen appellate issues and independently reviewing the capital sentences.