Summary
Justice Tom Glaze explains why he will not recuse from the Arkansas Supreme Court appeal in Villines v. Harris. The document discusses prior recusal proceedings, the rule of necessity, and Arkansas decisions holding that disqualification requires a judge to have a personal, proprietary, or pecuniary interest greater than that of an ordinary citizen or taxpayer.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the justice was disqualified or required to recuse from the pending appeal because of a personal, familial, or pecuniary interest in tax-related questions.
- Whether a prior recusal in the same case prevented the justice from reassuming jurisdiction after the basis for disqualification had been removed.
Holdings
- Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, a prior determination of disqualification does not prevent a judge from reassuming full jurisdiction when the disqualification has been removed.
- A judge is not disqualified based on an interest shared by an ordinary citizen and taxpayer; the judge's personal, proprietary, or pecuniary interest must be greater than that of an ordinary citizen and taxpayer.
- A judge has a duty to remain on a case when there is no valid reason for disqualification.
Key quotations
“As you are fully aware, the law is well settled that a judge has a duty to remain on a case if there is no valid reason for the judge to disqualify.”
“Here, neither I, nor my family, has any greater interest in this case than any ordinary citizen or taxpayer.”
Factual background
The appeal involved tax and related questions concerning Arkansas constitutional and statutory law. The justice stated that neither the justice nor the justice's family had a greater interest in the case than an ordinary citizen or taxpayer. The justice also noted that potential special justices would likely be property owners and taxpayers who could be affected by the decision.
Procedural history
The justice had previously recused in the same matter, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed that decision in 2000. On the renewed recusal issue, the justice concluded that no valid basis for disqualification existed and that the justice had a duty to remain on the appeal.