Summary
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Anna Clark’s convictions for two counts of third-degree sexual assault. The court held that it independently reviews the voluntariness of a confession while reviewing historical facts for clear error, and concluded that Clark’s confession was voluntary despite alleged promises and the incomplete recording of her interrogation. The court also declined to recognize a constitutional right to recording of an entire interrogation and upheld the trial court’s refusal to give Clark’s proposed jury instructions.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Arkansas appellate review of the voluntariness of a confession must follow the Ornelas de novo standard as a constitutional requirement.
- Whether Clark's confession was involuntary because it resulted from false promises of leniency.
- Whether article 2, section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution creates a constitutional right to recording of the entire police interrogation leading to a confession.
- Whether the trial court erred by refusing Clark's proposed instruction stating that the jury independently determines the weight and credibility of a defendant's confession.
- Whether AMI Criminal 2d 110's reasonable-doubt instruction violates federal or state due process, and whether the court was required to give Clark's proposed near-certainty language.
Holdings
- Arkansas is not constitutionally required to apply the Ornelas standard to confession-voluntariness determinations, but Arkansas's existing standard is consistent with Ornelas: historical facts are reviewed for clear error and the ultimate voluntariness question is independently or de novo reviewed.
- The circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Clark's confession was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given; the confession was not shown to have resulted from an unambiguous false promise or from coercion that overbore her free will.
- Article 2, section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution does not create a constitutional right to recording of all phases of a police interrogation leading to a confession, and the absence of a complete recording does not alone invalidate the confession.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Clark's proposed instruction concerning the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of her confession because AMI Criminal 2d 104 adequately covered that subject.
- AMI Criminal 2d 110, considered as a whole, correctly conveys the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and does not violate federal or Arkansas due process; the trial court properly refused to add Clark's proposed near-certainty language.
Key quotations
“We now take this opportunity to reiterate that in cases involving a ruling on the voluntariness of a confession, this court makes an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. We review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error, and the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary is subject to an independent, or de novo, determination by this court.” (374 Ark. at 572)
“In the absence of any indication that our court has traditionally viewed custodial interrogation requirements more rigorously than the federal courts, we reject the expansion of constitutional rights proposed by Appellant.” (374 Ark. at 574)
“In conclusion, we hold that AMI Criminal 2d 110, taken as a whole, correctly conveys the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” (374 Ark. at 579)
Factual background
Anna Clark, a psychologist employed by the Arkansas Department of Correction, was discovered by a correctional officer having sexual intercourse with inmate Dan Burns in her counseling office. Clark initially denied the allegations to the warden but later admitted them during an interview with Detective Kenneth Whitmore. The detective did not record the first approximately one hour and fifteen minutes of the interview, including the period before the confession recording began. Clark claimed that Whitmore made false promises of leniency, while Whitmore denied doing so; Clark had a doctoral degree, signed a Miranda waiver, and understood that her conduct could result in criminal charges, loss of her license, and imprisonment.
Procedural history
Clark was charged by felony information with two counts of third-degree sexual assault. The circuit court denied her motion to suppress after finding that her confession was freely and voluntarily given. Following trial, she was convicted on both counts and sentenced to three years in the Arkansas Department of Correction and fined $5,000 on each count. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed.