Gibbs v. PrimeLending

381 S.W.3d 829 (Ark. 2011) · Supreme Court of Arkansas · June 16, 2011

Summary

The Arkansas Supreme Court answered a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas concerning whether applying the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction violates Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-4-101. The court held that the theory does not violate the statute because Arkansas's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by federal due process, and concluded that conspiracy-based jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible.

Court
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Writing for the Court
Jim Hannah, Chief Justice
Jurisdiction
Arkansas
Decision date
June 16, 2011
Procedural posture
The Supreme Court of Arkansas answered a question of Arkansas law certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas concerning whether Arkansas's long-arm statute permits use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction.
Standard of review
De novo review of the certified question of law and the constitutional and statutory basis for personal jurisdiction.
Precedential value
Published Arkansas Supreme Court opinion; binding precedent on the certified question under Arkansas law.
Parties
Mark Gibbs, Karla Gibbs v. PrimeLending, Corinthian Title Company, Inc., C. Ryan Brown, Shelley Hickson, Amy Christine Tueckes
Disposition
other

Topics

personal jurisdictioncivil proceduredue processstatutory interpretation

Practice areas

civil procedurepersonal jurisdictionconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-4-101.
  2. Whether conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holdings

  1. The use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-4-101.

Key quotations

We answer in the negative. (381 S.W.3d at 829)
We conclude that jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory does not violate due process. As such, the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-4-101. (381 S.W.3d at 833-34)

Factual background

The Gibbses agreed to refinance their home after being redirected from Morgan Stanley to PrimeLending. Their refinancing was routed through title and escrow entities involved in an alleged kickback and licensing scheme, and eLender Escrow handled the transaction despite the revocation of its California escrow license. The loan proceeds intended to pay off the existing Morgan Stanley mortgage were misappropriated, leaving the Gibbses with two mortgages and total indebtedness of approximately $2.7 million.

Procedural history

The Gibbses filed federal claims arising from an allegedly fraudulent mortgage-refinancing and escrow transaction. Several defendants argued that the federal court lacked personal jurisdiction because Arkansas's long-arm statute did not permit conspiracy jurisdiction. The federal district court certified the question to the Arkansas Supreme Court under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8, and the Arkansas Supreme Court accepted the question on December 16, 2010.

Remand instructions

The certified question was answered in the negative; the case was returned to the federal district court for further proceedings.

Court Document

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