Summary
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the State's petition for a writ of quo warranto seeking to prevent Steve Jernigan from serving as mayor of Lepanto. The court held that, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-42-201(c)(1), "reside" means to live or be physically present within the municipal limits and does not require domiciliary intent. Deferring to the circuit court's credibility determinations, the court concluded that the State failed to prove that Jernigan did not reside in Lepanto when he filed as a candidate and thereafter.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-42-201(c)(1) requires a candidate for mayor to be domiciled within the municipality, including an intent to establish a fixed and permanent home, or merely to live or be physically present within the municipal limits.
- Whether the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the State failed to prove that Jernigan did not reside within Lepanto when he filed as a candidate and while serving as mayor.
- What standard of appellate review applies to the circuit court's factual findings in this bench-trial quo warranto proceeding.
Holdings
- For purposes of section 14-42-201(c)(1), "reside" means to live or be physically present within the corporate municipal limits; the statute does not require a candidate for mayor to establish domicile or prove an intent to make the municipality a fixed and permanent home.
- The circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the State failed to prove that Jernigan did not reside within Lepanto when he filed his candidacy and thereafter.
- A person may establish residency for voter or public-office qualification purposes by proving either physical presence in the required location or an intent to establish domicile there when physical presence is insufficient.
- Findings from a civil bench trial are reviewed for clear error, not for whether substantial evidence supports the findings.
Key quotations
“Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude that, for the purposes of section 14-42-201(c)(l), the legislature intended for “reside” to mean “live” or “be physically present.””
“A better statement of the law is that, in determining the residency of voters and public officials, this court has considered (1) whether a person was physically present in a particular location, or (2) whether a person intended to establish a domicile in a particular location.”
Factual background
Jernigan owned and lived with his wife in a home outside Lepanto's corporate limits. Before filing as a mayoral candidate, he rented furnished residences within Lepanto, listed a Lepanto address on his political-practices pledge and affidavit of eligibility, changed his voter-registration precinct, and testified that he spent nights at one of the rented residences. The State argued that these arrangements were a subterfuge because Jernigan did not intend to abandon his longtime home outside the city, while Jernigan claimed that he had moved his residence to Lepanto and intended to remain there.
Procedural history
Jernigan was elected mayor of Lepanto in a November 28, 2010 runoff election. The State filed a quo warranto petition on December 28, 2010, alleging that Jernigan failed to satisfy Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-42-201(c)(1)'s municipal-residency requirement. After denying Jernigan's motion to dismiss, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, finding that the State failed to prove that Jernigan did not reside within Lepanto. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.