Floyd v. State

Summary

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed an order disqualifying Gerald K. Crow from representing Phillip Floyd in a rape prosecution. The court held that Crow had participated personally and substantially in the matter as a judge by issuing Floyd’s arrest warrant and presiding over his plea-and-arraignment hearing, requiring the State’s informed written consent under Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12. The opinion includes a concurrence and two dissents.

Holdings

1. A lawyer's prior participation as a judge in issuing an arrest warrant is personal and substantial because the issuing judge must determine whether the supporting affidavit establishes reasonable grounds for the arrest; it is not merely a remote or incidental administrative responsibility.
2. A lawyer's prior participation as the presiding judge in a criminal defendant's plea-and-arraignment hearing is personal and substantial and therefore disqualifies the lawyer from later representing the defendant absent informed written consent from all parties.
3. The State was not required to establish actual prejudice from Crow's representation because the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct do not impose a prejudice requirement for disqualification under these circumstances.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Crow's prior participation in issuing Floyd's arrest warrant was personal and substantial under Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12.
2. Whether Crow's prior participation as judge at Floyd's plea-and-arraignment hearing was personal and substantial under Rule 1.12.
3. Whether the State was required to establish prejudice before seeking Crow's disqualification.
4. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by disqualifying Crow from representing Floyd.