Finch v. State

542 S.W.3d 143 (Ark. 2018) · Supreme Court of Arkansas · April 5, 2018

Summary

The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed Elliott Harold Finch Jr.'s convictions and sentence for aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening. The court held that the circuit court did not err in denying Finch's requests for self-representation, although it concluded that the court should have conducted a more complete inquiry into a juror's use of a cell phone during deliberations. The court nevertheless found no reasonable probability of prejudice because the juror had looked up the definition of “hung jury.”

Court
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Writing for the Court
Robin F. Wynne; Baker, J.; Josephine Linker Hart
Jurisdiction
Arkansas
Decision date
April 5, 2018
Procedural posture
Criminal appeal from convictions and sentence following a Pulaski County jury trial. The appellant challenged the denial of his requests to represent himself and the denial of a mistrial based on juror misconduct involving cell-phone research during deliberations.
Standard of review
The denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Following alleged juror misconduct, the moving party must prove both misconduct and a reasonable possibility of prejudice. Whether a defendant unequivocally and timely invoked self-representation, knowingly and intelligently waived counsel, and engaged in conduct preventing a fair and orderly trial is reviewed under the applicable constitutional waiver principles.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas
Parties
Elliott Harold Finch, Jr. v. State of Arkansas
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

right to counselsixth amendmentcriminal procedureevidenceappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawcriminal appellate practiceevidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the circuit court improperly denied Finch's requests to waive appointed counsel and represent himself at trial.
  2. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial without permitting a fuller inquiry into information a juror researched on a cell phone and shared during deliberations.
  3. Whether the juror's research into the definition of a hung jury created a reasonable possibility of prejudice requiring a new trial.

Holdings

  1. The circuit court did not reversibly err in denying Finch's requests for self-representation because, considering the record as a whole, it could conclude that the requests were not unequivocal and that Finch had engaged in conduct that could prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues.
  2. Rule 606(b) did not bar the circuit court from conducting a reasonable inquiry into the nature of the information Juror 4 researched on his cell phone and shared with other jurors.
  3. Finch failed to show a reasonable possibility of prejudice from Juror 4's research into the definition of a hung jury, so the denial of the mistrial and new-trial relief was affirmed.

Key quotations

We do not read the language of Rule 606(b) to preclude the questioning of Juror 4 as to what he had researched on his cell phone and shared with the other jurors. (at 149)
In short, there is nothing in either Rule 606(b) or any precedent of which we are aware that would have prevented the circuit court from undertaking a reasonable inquiry into the nature of the extraneous information when it was brought to the court's attention during deliberations. (at 149)

Factual background

Finch was charged after entering his former girlfriend's residence, pointing a gun at her, threatening to kill her and her children, and remaining in the residence until police intervened. Police found a gun and magazine under the bed and a broken window. During deliberations, a juror used a cell phone to look up information and shared it with other jurors; the later-disclosed information was the definition of a hung jury.

Procedural history

Finch was convicted of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening, with firearm enhancements and habitual-offender sentencing. The jury could not reach a verdict on kidnapping, and the circuit court declared a mistrial on that charge. The circuit court denied Finch's mistrial motion and later denied his motions for new trial and reconsideration. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.

Court Document

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