In re Kavanaugh; In re Alberto J. Moreno; In re Larry Smith

In re Kavanaugh · California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One · February 25, 2021 · No. D076500, D076821, D077003

Summary

The California Court of Appeal reviewed consolidated habeas corpus proceedings involving parole denials under California’s Proposition 57 early-parole regulations for persons convicted of nonviolent felonies. It held that the regulations were consistent with the California Constitution and did not violate prisoners’ procedural due process rights, reversing the superior courts’ orders granting habeas relief. The opinion concerns Alexei Kavanaugh, Alberto J. Moreno, and Larry Smith.

Court
California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One
Writing for the Court
McConnell, P. J.; Benke, J.; O'Rourke, J.
Jurisdiction
California
Decision date
February 25, 2021
Docket number
D076500, D076821, D077003
Procedural posture
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation appealed consolidated superior court orders granting three habeas corpus petitions, invalidating parole regulations governing early parole consideration for determinately sentenced nonviolent felons, and ordering new parole proceedings.
Standard of review
Independent judgment in construing constitutional provisions and reviewing the validity of administrative regulations, with agency interpretations receiving great weight when reasonable; case-by-case balancing under the Ramirez due process test; limited judicial review of parole denials for some evidence.
Precedential value
published and precedential
Parties
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Alexei Kavanaugh, Alberto J. Moreno, Larry Smith
Disposition
reversed

Topics

state post-conviction reliefprocedural due processadministrative lawstatutory interpretationvoid for vagueness

Practice areas

California habeas corpusstate post-conviction reliefparoleadministrative lawconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the trial courts exceeded the permissible scope of the habeas corpus proceedings by granting relief based on challenges to the parole regulations.
  2. Whether CDCR regulations governing early parole consideration for determinately sentenced nonviolent felons conflict with article I, section 32 of the California Constitution because they do not require appointed counsel, in-person hearings, or multi-member parole panels.
  3. Whether the parole regulations violate procedural due process by failing to provide counsel, in-person hearings, or multi-member parole panels.
  4. Whether the parole criteria regulation is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify the amount or type of rehabilitative programming required for parole suitability.

Holdings

  1. The trial courts did not impermissibly expand the habeas corpus proceedings because the pro se petitions sufficiently alleged due process violations, arbitrary or capricious parole decisions, and conflicts between the parole procedures and Proposition 57.
  2. Article I, section 32, subdivision (a)(1) of the California Constitution guarantees eligible nonviolent felons parole consideration, but does not mandate appointed counsel, in-person hearings, or multi-member parole panels.
  3. Prisoners do not have a procedural due process right to appointed legal counsel during parole proceedings.
  4. The parole regulations provide constitutionally sufficient procedural due process even though they do not require annual in-person hearings or multi-member parole panels.
  5. Title 15, section 2449.5 of the California Code of Regulations is sufficiently definite and is not unconstitutionally vague.

Key quotations

In contrast to the trial courts, we conclude the parole regulations do not conflict with the constitutional guarantee of parole consideration or violate due process. (2)
Section 32 guarantees parole consideration for eligible persons who have been sentenced to prison for a nonviolent felony offense. But it does not mandate any specific parole consideration procedures. (25)
Considering all these factors, we conclude the parole regulations afford prisoners reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. That is all due process requires. (38)
Therefore, the parole criteria regulation is not unconstitutionally vague. (42)

Factual background

Kavanaugh, Moreno, and Smith were serving determinate prison sentences for nonviolent felony offenses and became eligible for early parole consideration under Proposition 57 and CDCR regulations. Hearing officers reviewed their records, found that each posed an unreasonable risk to the community, and denied parole; Moreno and Smith also obtained review by a second hearing officer, who affirmed the denials. Their habeas petitions challenged the parole denials and the procedures used under the regulations.

Procedural history

Kavanaugh, Moreno, and Smith separately petitioned the San Diego County Superior Court for habeas corpus relief after hearing officers denied them early parole release under regulations adopted pursuant to Proposition 57. The superior courts granted relief, concluding that the regulations violated article I, section 32 of the California Constitution and procedural due process because they did not provide counsel, in-person hearings, or multi-member parole panels. The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals and reversed.

Remand instructions

The orders granting the habeas corpus petitions are reversed. No additional remand instructions are stated.

Court Document

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