Summary
The California Supreme Court considers whether statutory provisions allowing the refiling of certain time-barred sex-crime charges against minors violate the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. It holds that refiling legislation cannot retroactively reopen cases dismissed as final judgments before the relevant refiling provision took effect, but concludes that the refiling in Bunn was constitutionally permissible because the 1996 provision was in effect when the prior dismissal became final.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether California's separation of powers clause permits Penal Code section 803(g) to authorize refiling charges that had previously been dismissed.
- Whether the 1996 refiling provision could constitutionally apply to Bunn's case when it was already in effect at the time the prior dismissal became final on appellate review.
- Whether application of the refiling provision violated ex post facto or due process principles.
Holdings
- A refiling provision like Penal Code section 803(g) may not be applied retroactively to reopen a criminal case whose dismissal became final before the provision took effect and before the applicable law of finality changed.
- A judgment is not constitutionally immune from reopening to the extent that a refiling or reopening provision was already in effect when the judgment became final under the law of finality.
- The prosecution of Bunn under the refiled complaint did not violate the separation of powers clause because the 1996 refiling provision was in effect when appellate review of the prior dismissal was completed and the refiled complaint satisfied that provision.
- The ex post facto and due process objections did not bar prosecution under section 803(g); those issues had been resolved adversely to the defendant in People v. Frazer.
Key quotations
“We therefore hold that a refiling provision like section 803(g) cannot be retroactively applied to subvert judgments that became final before the provision took effect, and before the law of finality changed.” (24-25)
“By the same token, a judgment is not final for separation of powers purposes, and reopening of the case can occur, under the specific terms of refiling legislation already in effect when the judicial branch completed its review and ultimately decided the case.” (25)
Factual background
The prosecution alleged that Bunn forcibly raped and orally copulated his daughter while she was 15 or 16 years old in 1981. The victim reported the offenses in December 1994, after the ordinary statute of limitations had expired, and investigative materials allegedly provided independent corroboration. A 1995 complaint was dismissed, but after the 1996 amendment to Penal Code section 803(g), the People refiled the same six counts on June 30, 1997, within the statutory refiling period.
Procedural history
Bunn was initially charged in 1995 under the 1994 version of Penal Code section 803(g). The municipal court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the case on ex post facto grounds; the superior court denied reinstatement, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in People v. Bunn (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 227. After the Legislature amended section 803(g), the People refiled the charges on June 30, 1997. The superior court dismissed the resulting information, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment.