Brice v. Pugh

143 Colo. 508 (1960) (Colo. 1960) · Supreme Court of Colorado · August 2, 1960 · No. No. 18840

Summary

The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether an oil and gas lessee was obligated to pay a bonus draft after discovering a recorded prior lease affecting the property. The court held that the prior lease constituted a material title defect and that recording the new lease did not, by itself, waive the lessee's right to reject it. The judgment for the lessors was reversed, and the case was remanded with directions to dismiss the action.

Court
Supreme Court of Colorado
Writing for the Court
Per Curiam; Moore; Day; Frantz
Jurisdiction
Colorado
Decision date
August 2, 1960
Docket number
No. 18840
Procedural posture
Defendant sought review by writ of error from a trial-court judgment awarding plaintiffs $3,240 on a dishonored sight draft issued as consideration for an oil and gas lease.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the trial court's legal conclusions and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting its finding of waiver.
Precedential value
Published opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Parties
W. B. Brice v. Lloyd L. Pugh, Tressie R. Pugh
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

oil and gastitle disputescontractswaiver of breachappellate procedure

Practice areas

oil and gas lawreal estate lawcontract lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the recorded Latta oil and gas lease constituted a material title defect that excused Brice from accepting and paying for the plaintiffs' lease.
  2. Whether Brice waived his right to reject the lease by recording it.

Holdings

  1. A recorded oil and gas lease that appeared on its face to remain in force constituted a material title defect, and Brice was excused from accepting and paying for the plaintiffs' lease absent special circumstances.
  2. Recording the lease did not, as a matter of law, constitute acceptance of title or waiver of the right to reject the lease; waiver had to be established by evidence of an intentional relinquishment of a known right.

Key quotations

Recording alone is not, as a matter of law, an acceptance of title nor does it necessarily constitute "exercising dominion over" a lease. (354 P.2d at 1027)
Waiver is defined as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." (354 P.2d at 1027)

Factual background

The plaintiffs owned 3,280 acres in Kit Carson County and executed an oil and gas lease in favor of Brice in exchange for a sixty-day sight draft for $3,240. A title memorandum disclosed a recorded lease to John Latta covering the entire leasehold interest, and the record did not show that the Latta lease had expired or been released. Brice recorded the new lease, refused to pay the draft, and later recorded a release; the plaintiffs then sued to recover the draft amount.

Procedural history

The Colorado trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $3,240. It concluded that the title defects identified in the title memorandum were not valid objections and that, even if the title was defective, recording the lease waived the defendant's objections. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the action.

Remand instructions

Remanded with directions to dismiss the action.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…

More from Colorado Supreme Court