People v. Duncan

Summary

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision vacating John Duncan’s conviction for accessory to first-degree murder based on an alleged statutory speedy-trial violation. The court held that, absent prosecutorial bad faith, defense counsel’s request for a continuance to investigate late-disclosed discovery triggered a new six-month speedy-trial period under Colorado Revised Statutes section 18-1-405(3). Because Duncan was tried within that extended period, the speedy-trial statute was not violated.

Holdings

1. A continuance granted at the request of the defendant or defense counsel begins a new six-month period under section 18-1-405(3), rather than merely excluding the period of delay under section 18-1-405(6)(f).
2. In the absence of prosecutorial bad faith or deliberate misconduct intended to force the defendant to waive speedy trial rights, a defense-requested continuance is chargeable to the defendant under section 18-1-405(3).
3. A defendant cannot avoid the statutory consequences of a defense-requested continuance merely by objecting that the rescheduled trial date falls outside the original speedy-trial period.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a defense counsel's request for a continuance to investigate late-disclosed discovery triggers the six-month extension under Colorado Revised Statutes section 18-1-405(3).
2. Whether the defendant's objection to setting the continued trial date outside the original speedy-trial period prevents the continuance from being treated as requested by the defendant.
3. Whether the absence of prosecutorial bad faith changes the statutory speedy-trial consequence of the defense-requested continuance.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded