Summary
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that Colorado's aggravated sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401(6), is constitutional when applied consistently with Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington. Aggravating sentencing may rely on jury-found facts, facts admitted by the defendant, stipulated judicial fact-finding, or facts concerning prior convictions. The court upheld Robert Lopez's twelve-year aggravated sentence for possession of cocaine because the sentencing court relied in part on prior-conviction facts reflected in a jury verdict.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Colorado Revised Statutes section 18-1.3-401(6), authorizing aggravated sentences based on extraordinary aggravating circumstances, is unconstitutional under Apprendi and Blakely.
- Whether a guilty plea and general advisement that an aggravated sentence was possible authorize judicial reliance on facts not admitted by the defendant to impose an aggravated sentence.
- Whether prior conviction facts reflected in a jury verdict may constitutionally support an aggravated sentence for a separate offense.
- Whether the aggravated possession sentence was permissible where the trial court relied on the prior vehicular-homicide convictions as at least one constitutionally permissible aggravating factor.
Holdings
- Section 18-1.3-401(6) is constitutional when applied consistently with Apprendi and Blakely. An aggravated sentence outside the presumptive range may be based on facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, facts admitted by the defendant, facts found by a judge after the defendant stipulates to judicial fact-finding for sentencing purposes, or facts concerning prior convictions.
- A general advisement that an aggravated sentence is possible, and a guilty plea to the underlying offense, do not by themselves authorize judicial fact-finding concerning additional aggravating facts.
- The vehicular-homicide convictions, entered on jury verdicts before the possession sentence was imposed, were proper Blakely-exempt aggravating factors and adequately supported the twelve-year aggravated possession sentence.
Key quotations
“In light of Blakely, section 18-1.3-401(6) aggravated sentencing may rely on at least one of four kinds of facts: (1) facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) facts admitted by the defendant; (3) facts found by a judge after the defendant stipulates to judicial fact-finding for sentencing purposes; and (4) facts regarding prior convictions.” (113 P.3d at 716)
“A guilty plea waives the right to a jury trial on the issue of guilt but is not a stipulation to judicial sentencing based on facts not admitted in the plea.” (113 P.3d at 726-27)
“One Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt factor is sufficient to support an aggravated sentence.” (113 P.3d at 731)
Factual background
Lopez pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and received a deferred judgment and sentence for two years. During the deferral period, he failed drug treatment and had multiple positive drug tests. He later drove while intoxicated and killed another driver; a jury convicted him of vehicular homicide and related driving offenses before the trial court sentenced him on the deferred possession offense.
Procedural history
Lopez pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and received a two-year deferred judgment and sentence. After he violated conditions of deferral and was convicted by a jury of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence, driving with excessive alcohol content, and reckless driving, the trial court imposed consecutive twelve-year sentences, including an aggravated twelve-year sentence for the possession offense. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Apprendi and Blakely invalidated the aggravated sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds and upheld the sentence.