Farrar v. People

208 P.3d 702 (Colo. 2009) · Supreme Court of Colorado · May 26, 2009 · No. No. 07SC983

Summary

The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the denial of Charles A. Farrar's motion for a new trial based on the child victim's post-trial recantation of sexual-abuse allegations. The court held that newly discovered recantation evidence must probably result in an acquittal, requiring an objective assessment of whether reasonable jurors would believe the recantation and acquit. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the recantation no more credible than the victim's trial testimony.

Court
Supreme Court of Colorado
Writing for the Court
Justice Coats; Justice Bender; Chief Justice Mullarkey; Justice Martinez
Jurisdiction
Colorado
Decision date
May 26, 2009
Docket number
No. 07SC983
Procedural posture
Petition for review of the court of appeals' affirmance of the denial of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence consisting principally of the child victim's post-trial recantation.
Standard of review
Abuse of discretion. The district court's factual determinations concerning the recanting witness were reviewed for clear error, while the court was required to apply an objective standard in assessing whether the new evidence would probably lead reasonable jurors to acquit.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Charles A. Farrar v. The People of the State of Colorado
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

post-conviction reliefcriminal procedureappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

criminal procedureevidencepost-conviction reliefappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of Farrar's motion for a new trial based on the victim's post-trial recantation and other newly discovered evidence.
  2. What standard governs a motion for a new trial based on a witness recantation, including whether the recantation must probably be believed by reasonable jurors and probably result in an acquittal.
  3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by finding that the recantation was no more credible than the victim's trial testimony and would not probably produce an acquittal.

Holdings

  1. Newly discovered evidence supporting a criminal motion for new trial must have been unknown and unknowable through due diligence at the time of trial, be relevant to material issues, be consequential to the outcome for reasons beyond merely impeaching trial evidence, and be sufficiently significant that it would probably produce an acquittal.
  2. A witness recantation may justify a new trial only when it provides sufficiently significant new evidence, is more likely than not to be believed by reasonable jurors, and would probably cause reasonable jurors to acquit; a recantation is not sufficient merely because it impeaches the witness's prior testimony.
  3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial because it considered the evidence bearing on the victim's credibility, objectively assessed the probable effect of the recantation on reasonable jurors, and was not reasonably convinced that the victim's trial testimony was probably false or that the recantation would probably result in an acquittal.

Key quotations

Rather than merely creating reasonable doubt by demonstrating that the recanting witness has given different and irreconcilable testimony on different occasions, recantation can justify a new trial only if it contains sufficiently significant new evidence, and if it, rather than the witness's inconsistent trial testimony, will probably be believed. (707-708)
After considering all of the circumstances impinging on the recanting witness's credibility, including the existence of her prior inconsistent testimony, the court must determine whether it is more likely than not that reasonable jurors would believe her more recent testimony. (708)
Because the district court heard and considered all available evidence bearing on the credibility of the recanting witness and was still not reasonably convinced that the victim's testimony at trial was probably false, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Farrar's motion for new trial. (710)

Factual background

The victim, Farrar's stepdaughter, was the only direct evidence supporting the sexual-assault charges and there was no physical or eyewitness corroboration. Approximately one year after Farrar's conviction, while his direct appeal was pending, the victim recanted her allegations and claimed that the abuse had been fabricated and that she had been pressured by prosecutors and social workers. At extensive evidentiary hearings, the victim, relatives, prosecutors, social workers, a guardian ad litem, and a former boyfriend gave conflicting accounts concerning both the original allegations and the recantation. The district court found substantial credibility problems in the victim's trial and post-trial testimony and concluded that the new evidence would probably not produce an acquittal.

Procedural history

Farrar was convicted of numerous sexual-assault-on-a-child-related offenses and sentenced to 145 years to life imprisonment. While his direct appeal was pending, the victim supplied an affidavit recanting her allegations, and the court of appeals granted a limited remand for the district court to consider a motion for new trial. After evidentiary hearings, the district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed that ruling while reversing portions of the judgment and remanding for resentencing and correction of the mittimus. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review solely on the denial of the motion for new trial and affirmed.

Court Document

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