People v. Hyde

2017 CO 24 (2017) · Supreme Court of Colorado · April 17, 2017 · No. 15SA291

Summary

The Colorado Supreme Court considers whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious driver violated the Fourth Amendment. The court holds that driving in Colorado constitutes statutory consent to blood-alcohol testing under the Expressed Consent Statute, and that this statutory consent satisfies the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The court reverses the trial court’s order suppressing the blood-draw evidence.

Court
Supreme Court of Colorado
Writing for the Court
Justice Hood; Chief Justice Rice; Justice Coats; Justice Eid
Jurisdiction
Colorado
Decision date
April 17, 2017
Docket number
15SA291
Procedural posture
Interlocutory appeal by the People under section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2016), and C.A.R. 4.1, challenging the trial court's order suppressing warrantless blood-draw evidence.
Standard of review
Suppression rulings present a mixed question of fact and law. The appellate court defers to supported factual findings but reviews the legal effect of those facts de novo.
Precedential value
Published, precedential en banc opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Parties
The People of the State of Colorado v. Oliver Benton Hyde
Disposition
reversed

Topics

search and seizurewarrant requirementfourth amendmentsuppression of evidenceappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawDUI and impaired drivingevidenceappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Colorado's Expressed Consent Statute supplied valid consent under the Fourth Amendment for a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious driver when police had probable cause to believe the driver had been driving under the influence.
  2. Whether applying the statute to require blood testing of an unconscious driver violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating unconscious drivers differently from conscious drivers.

Holdings

  1. By driving in Colorado, Hyde consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that an unconscious driver be tested. That statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, so the warrantless blood draw was constitutional.
  2. Section 42-4-1301.1(8) does not violate equal protection because the classification between unconscious and conscious drivers is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of obtaining evidence needed to deter and prosecute impaired driving.

Key quotations

It is well established that a search is reasonable when the subject consents, and that sometimes consent to a search need not be express but may be fairly inferred from context. (¶ 21)
there is no constitutional right to refuse a blood-alcohol test. (¶ 27)
By driving in Colorado, Hyde consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to blood-alcohol testing under the circumstances present here. (¶ 32)

Factual background

Hyde drove his pickup truck into a light pole and was found unconscious and pinned in the driver's seat. An officer smelled alcohol, and a passenger reported that Hyde had consumed three beers. At the hospital, police requested a blood draw without obtaining a warrant or contemporaneous consent because Hyde was unconscious; the test, taken less than two hours after the accident, showed a BAC of 0.06.

Procedural history

Hyde was charged with DUI after a blood test taken while he was unconscious showed a BAC of 0.06. The trial court found probable cause but suppressed the blood-test result, concluding that the warrantless draw violated the Fourth Amendment because Hyde had no contemporaneous opportunity to refuse. The People filed an interlocutory appeal.

Court Document

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