People v. Simpson

2017 CO 25 (2017) · Supreme Court of Colorado · April 17, 2017 · No. 15SA330

Summary

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s suppression of blood-draw evidence in an interlocutory appeal arising from a DUI prosecution. The court held that by driving in Colorado, the defendant consented under the Expressed Consent Statute to a blood or breath test when statutory conditions were met, and that this prior statutory consent satisfied the Fourth Amendment consent exception. The court concluded that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional.

Court
Supreme Court of Colorado
Writing for the Court
Justice Hood; Chief Justice Rice; Justice Coats; Justice Eid; Justice Martinez; Justice Gabriel; Justice Márquez
Jurisdiction
Colorado
Decision date
April 17, 2017
Docket number
15SA330
Procedural posture
The People brought an interlocutory appeal from the district court's order suppressing blood-draw evidence in a DUI prosecution.
Standard of review
Suppression orders present a mixed question of law and fact. The court defers to factual findings supported by the record but reviews the legal effect of those facts de novo.
Precedential value
Published, precedential opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court; decided en banc.
Parties
The People of the State of Colorado v. William Paul Simpson
Disposition
reversed

Topics

fourth amendmentsearch and seizurewarrant requirementsuppression of evidenceappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawDUI enforcementevidenceappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether driving in Colorado constitutes prior statutory consent to a blood draw under the Colorado Expressed Consent Statute when an officer has probable cause to suspect DUI.
  2. Whether that prior statutory consent satisfies the Fourth Amendment consent exception to the warrant requirement without a separate determination that the defendant's contemporaneous consent was voluntary.
  3. Whether the trial court properly suppressed the blood-test evidence.

Holdings

  1. By driving in Colorado, Simpson consented in advance to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including the requirement that he submit to a blood draw when an officer has probable cause to suspect DUI and the statutory circumstances require a blood test.
  2. Simpson's prior statutory consent satisfied the Fourth Amendment consent exception to the warrant requirement, so the blood draw was constitutional.

Key quotations

Simpson’s prior statutory consent satisfies the consent exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the blood draw at issue here was constitutional. (¶ 2)
By driving in Colorado, Simpson consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to a blood draw under the circumstances present here. (¶ 25)
That prior statutory consent eliminated the need for the trial court to assess the voluntariness of Simpson’s consent at the time of his interaction with law enforcement. (¶ 25)

Factual background

Officer MacDonald observed Simpson's pickup truck bounce off a curb repeatedly, cross a median, and veer into oncoming traffic. Simpson smelled of alcohol, had red and watery eyes, admitted drinking, and could not exit the truck without assistance. At the hospital, after receiving Colorado's expressed-consent advisement, Simpson selected a blood test, which showed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.448.

Procedural history

Simpson was charged with DUI and related offenses after police observed him driving erratically and detected signs of intoxication. The district court ruled that the expressed-consent advisement coerced Simpson, invalidated his consent, and suppressed the blood-test evidence; it also rejected exigent circumstances as an alternative justification. The People appealed under section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2016), and C.A.R. 4.1.

Court Document

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