Summary
The Connecticut Appellate Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release imposed for a pre-2012 capital felony constitutes a mandatory minimum sentence under General Statutes § 53a-39 (d) and therefore cannot be modified under § 53a-39. The court agreed that the sentence was not subject to modification but concluded that the trial court erred by dismissing the defendant’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The proper disposition was to deny the motion, so the judgment was reversed and remanded.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a definite sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release imposed under General Statutes § 53a-35a(1)(A) constitutes a mandatory minimum sentence under General Statutes § 53a-39(d), even though the sentencing statute does not use the phrases 'mandatory minimum' or 'may not be suspended or reduced.'
- Whether the limitation in § 53a-39(d) deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction or instead limits the court's statutory authority to modify the sentence.
- Whether the trial court properly dismissed the sentence-modification motion or should have denied it.
Holdings
- A definite sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release required by General Statutes § 53a-35a(1)(A) operates as a mandatory minimum sentence for purposes of § 53a-39(d), even though the statute does not expressly use the phrases 'mandatory minimum' or 'may not be suspended or reduced.'
- The limitation in § 53a-39(d) restricts the trial court's statutory authority to modify a sentence; it does not eliminate the court's subject matter jurisdiction over a sentence-modification motion.
- Because the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction but lacked authority to modify the mandatory minimum sentence, it should have denied the motion rather than dismissed it.
Key quotations
“This language already requires a court to impose a sentence of no less than life imprisonment without the possibility of release and, thus, operates as a mandatory minimum sentence.” (slip op. at 6)
“Therefore, the statutory limitation set forth in § 53a-39 (d) that ‘‘[t]he provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or reduced by the court’’ limits the court’s authority and not its subject matter jurisdiction.” (slip op. at 10)
Factual background
In December 2003, Norman Haughey entered the Hamden home of Donna Sosa and Mary Tomasi while seeking money to support a crack cocaine addiction. He attacked both women, killing them, and stole cash and blank checks. He was convicted of two counts each of murder and felony murder and one count of capital felony, and the court imposed life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Procedural history
The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Haven of two counts each of murder and felony murder and one count of capital felony. The trial court merged the murder and felony murder convictions with the capital felony conviction and imposed life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The trial court later dismissed the defendant's motion for sentence modification, concluding that the sentence was a mandatory minimum sentence outside the court's authority to modify and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the form of judgment and remanded with direction to deny the motion rather than dismiss it.
Remand instructions
Reverse the judgment dismissing the motion and remand with direction for the trial court to render judgment denying the defendant's motion for sentence modification.