Summary
This Connecticut Appellate Court decision addresses whether a trial court may conduct an evidentiary hearing and rely on witness testimony when ruling on a special motion to dismiss under the state's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court held that the statute's plain language limits judicial review to pleadings and supporting affidavits, rendering the evidentiary hearing and reliance on live testimony reversible error. The case was remanded to allow the parties to submit supplemental pleadings and affidavits for proper consideration.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether General Statutes § 52-196a authorizes a trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing with live witness testimony on a special motion to dismiss.
- Whether § 52-196a permits the trial court to rely on testimony and other evidence adduced at such a hearing rather than limiting consideration to pleadings, affidavits, and properly submitted documentary materials.
- Whether the trial court's use of live testimony and factual findings required reversal and remand for further proceedings.
- Whether collateral estoppel barred Eick from asserting that her report was truthful and made in good faith based on the administrative decision reversing the DCF substantiation.
Holdings
- Section 52-196a does not authorize a trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing involving live witness testimony on a special motion to dismiss.
- The court may consider the pleadings, affidavits, and documentary materials submitted with or as part of the parties' pleadings, but may not consider live testimony adduced at an evidentiary hearing.
- The trial court committed reversible error by conducting an evidentiary hearing and predicating its ruling on testimony from that hearing.
- Collateral estoppel did not bar Eick from asserting that her report was truthful and made in good faith because those issues were not fully litigated or definitively determined in the administrative proceeding, and Eick was not in privity with the Department of Children and Families.
Key quotations
“In light of the plain mandate of § 52-196a, which is intended to quickly dispose of meritless SLAPP litigation at minimal cost through consideration of the ‘‘pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits of the parties,’’ we conclude that § 52-196a cannot reasonably be read to authorize the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a special motion to dismiss.” (at 32)
“The court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s special motion to dismiss and to predicate its ruling on testimony from that hearing, therefore, constitutes reversible error.” (at 41)
“The issue of whether the defendant made her report of abuse truthfully and in good faith was neither fully litigated nor definitively determined in that proceeding. Moreover, privity between the defendant and the department is lacking.” (at 45-46)
Factual background
Eick reported to the pediatrician of Aguilar's stepchild that the child had stated Aguilar had physically and sexually abused her. The report led to a Department of Children and Families investigation and an initial substantiation of abuse, which an administrative hearing officer later reversed. Aguilar then sued Eick, alleging that her reports were false and motivated by self-interest; the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Eick's anti-SLAPP motion and relied on testimony in granting dismissal.
Procedural history
Aguilar brought claims for defamation, fraud, vexatious litigation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Eick's reports concerning alleged abuse of Aguilar's stepchild. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, relied in part on live testimony, granted Eick's special motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for her. The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed and remanded for proceedings using pleadings, affidavits, documentary materials, and argument rather than live testimony.
Remand instructions
The trial court must permit the parties to file any supplemental pleadings and supporting or opposing affidavits consistent with the opinion, conduct the hearing required by General Statutes § 52-196a(e)(1) based on the pleadings and affidavits submitted under § 52-196a(e)(2), and permit the parties to present argument. The court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing with live testimony or rely on testimony from the prior evidentiary hearing.