State v. March

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Dawn March’s application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. The court held that the applicable definitions of psychiatric disability and dangerousness were governed by the statutory and regulatory provisions concerning criminal acquittees, rather than the civil commitment standards. It further concluded that the trial court’s finding that March posed a danger to herself or others was not clearly erroneous and that continued confinement based on her current mental illness did not violate due process under Foucha v. Louisiana.

Holdings

1. The civil-commitment definitions in General Statutes § 17a-495 do not govern an acquittee's discharge proceeding under §§ 17a-580 and 17a-593. The applicable statutory scheme, together with the Psychiatric Security Review Board regulations, defines psychiatric disability by reference to mental illness or mental disease as defined in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and defines danger to self or others as the risk of imminent physical injury, including risk to others' property.
2. The trial court's determination that March posed a danger to herself or others was a factual finding subject to clearly erroneous review, not de novo review. The finding was not clearly erroneous because the trial court reasonably relied on the board's unanimous determination after March violated conditional release, concealed her conduct, and refused a current psychological evaluation.
3. Continued confinement did not violate substantive due process merely because March's current diagnosis of severe personality disorder differed from the psychosis underlying her original acquittal. An acquittee may remain confined when the acquittee has a current mental illness that requires confinement for treatment and protection and that is sufficiently related to potential dangerousness; the current diagnosis need not be identical to the original diagnosis.

Questions Presented

1. What definition of psychiatric disability and dangerousness governs an acquittee's application for discharge from the Psychiatric Security Review Board under General Statutes §§ 17a-580 and 17a-593?
2. Whether the trial court's finding that March posed a danger to herself or others was clearly erroneous.
3. Whether continued confinement based in part on March's current diagnosis of severe personality disorder, rather than the psychosis underlying her original acquittal, violated substantive due process or Foucha v. Louisiana.

Disposition

affirmed