Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld James G.'s convictions for first-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, and risk of injury to a child. The court held that testimony concerning the defendant's prior sexual abuse of another young girl was admissible to show a common plan or scheme and was not unduly prejudicial. The court also addressed the denial of access to confidential school and Department of Children and Families records, along with the defendant's ex post facto and prosecutorial-misconduct claims.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether evidence of the defendant's prior sexual abuse of K. was admissible to prove a common plan or scheme and, if so, whether its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion or violated due process by denying access to confidential school and department of children and families records after an in camera review.
- Whether applying the post-1995 version of Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute to conduct occurring in 1993 and 1994 violated the federal Ex Post Facto Clause or due process.
- Whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury using the statutory definitions of intimate parts and sexual contact.
- Whether the prosecutor's improper cross-examination question required a mistrial, a new trial, or exercise of the court's supervisory authority.
Holdings
- Prior-misconduct evidence is admissible under the common-plan-or-scheme exception when it is relevant and material to that exception and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting K.'s limited testimony because the abuse of K. and T. overlapped in time, involved materially similar conduct and circumstances, and involved similarly situated young girls with close relationships to the defendant.
- After a proper showing and in camera review, access to confidential records is committed to the trial court's discretion. The trial court did not abuse that discretion because the records contained no exculpatory or impeachment evidence and nothing material to T.'s ability to comprehend, know, or correctly relate the truth.
- Applying General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-21 (2) to the defendant's 1993-1994 conduct did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause or due process. The pre-1995 version of § 53-21, as construed by Connecticut precedent, already proscribed deliberate sexual touching of a child's private parts, and the amendment did not increase the punishment actually imposed on this defendant.
- The jury instruction was not improper merely because the pre-1995 version of § 53-21 did not expressly use the terms intimate parts and sexual contact. Connecticut precedent authorized use of the definitions in § 53a-65, and the post-1995 statute expressly incorporated those definitions.
- A single improper cross-examination question implying that the defendant had confessed did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial because the trial court immediately struck the question, characterized it as improper, and instructed the jury to disregard it. The denial of the motions for mistrial and new trial was not an abuse of discretion, and supervisory reversal was unwarranted.
Key quotations
“Such evidence is admissible if: (1) it is relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions; and (2) its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.” (268 Conn. at 390)
“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment—and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it ... by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” (268 Conn. at 407)
“The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor.” (268 Conn. at 419)
Factual background
The defendant was accused of sexually abusing his seven-year-old biological daughter, T., from April 1993 through January 1994. The state also presented testimony from T.'s older half-sister, K., concerning the defendant's earlier sexual abuse of her, which began when she was six or seven and continued until January 1994. The defendant had previously entered an Alford plea to unlawful restraint charges arising from K.'s allegations and received a suspended sentence and probation. During trial, the court admitted limited testimony from K., denied access to confidential school and department records after in camera review, and gave curative instructions after the prosecutor asked an improper question implying that the defendant had confessed to K.'s grandmother.
Procedural history
A jury found the defendant guilty, and the trial court entered judgment and imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-three years' imprisonment. The defendant appealed; the appeal was transferred from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Supreme Court rejected all claims and affirmed the judgment.