Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that a person asleep in the driver's seat of a stationary vehicle while intoxicated was operating the vehicle under General Statutes § 14-227a(a) because the key was inserted in the ignition. The court applied the definition of operation from State v. Swift and concluded that neither vehicle movement nor a running motor was required. It reversed the Appellate Court and directed it to affirm the trial court's judgment.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a defendant operates a motor vehicle under General Statutes § 14-227a (a) when he is asleep in the driver's seat of a stationary vehicle with the key inserted in the ignition.
- Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the state's allegation of operation despite the absence of evidence that the ignition key was in the on or start position.
Holdings
- A person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) by intentionally inserting the key into the ignition when the act, alone or in sequence with other steps, will set the vehicle's motive power in motion. The vehicle need not be moving and its motor need not be running.
- The precise position of the key was inconsequential. Mere insertion of the key into the ignition constituted operation, so the state was not required to prove that the key was in the accessory, on, or start position.
- State v. DeCoster did not control because its statement that the defendant was not operating the vehicle at the time of arrest was dictum; DeCoster was resolved on the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence concerning when the vehicle had been operated.
Key quotations
“A person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of this statute, when in the vehicle he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.” (552-553)
“In light of this policy and the fact that the insertion of a key into the ignition is an “act . . . which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Swift, supra, 125 Conn. 403; we conclude that the defendant’s act of inserting the key into the ignition constituted operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning of § 14-227a (a).” (555)
Factual background
A police officer found Andrew C. Haight asleep in the driver's seat of a legally parked Lexus RX 300 shortly after midnight. The vehicle's headlights were illuminated, the motor was not running, and the key was inserted in the ignition, although the officer did not determine the key's precise position. Haight failed field sobriety and breath tests and was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Procedural history
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that whether there had been operation of the vehicle was for the trier of fact. The defendant entered a conditional nolo contendere plea and appealed. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the state had not supported operation because the key was not shown to be in the on or start position. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court and remanded with direction to affirm the trial court's judgment.
Remand instructions
Remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court.