Summary
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the defendant's resentencing after determining in an earlier appeal that his original sentence of imprisonment followed by special parole was illegal. The court held that substituting probation for special parole unlawfully enlarged the sentence because a probation violation could expose the defendant to the full suspended sentence. It reversed the judgment and remanded for resentencing under the aggregate package theory, providing guidance on the interaction of Connecticut's sentencing statutes and addressing double-jeopardy issues likely to arise on remand.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether substituting ten years of probation for the ten years of special parole in the original sentence unconstitutionally enlarged the defendant's sentence in violation of due process.
- Whether a state's attorney's agreement to limit the sentence sought after a probation violation could prevent the resentencing court from imposing the full suspended sentence.
- Whether resentencing on all three convictions after the original sentence was held illegal violated the federal or Connecticut constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
- How the conflicting statutory provisions governing mandatory special parole and the maximum combined term should be reconciled on remand.
Holdings
- Substituting probation for special parole effectively enlarged the defendant's sentence because a probation violation could expose him to the full suspended sentence, including on the final day of probation, whereas a special-parole violation would expose him only to incarceration for the unexpired portion of special parole. The resentenced term therefore violated due process and was illegal.
- A state's attorney's agreement to recommend incarceration only for the time remaining on probation could not cure the illegal sentence because the agreement did not bind a future sentencing court, which retained statutory sentencing discretion.
- On remand, the trial court may impose a period of special parole without applying the otherwise mandatory ten-year minimum in General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 54-125e(c), provided that the combined incarceration and special-parole terms do not exceed the statutory maximum and the aggregate sentence does not exceed the original sentencing package.
- Resentencing the defendant on all three convictions did not violate the federal or Connecticut constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy because the original sentence was illegal, the entire sentencing package was subject to review, and the defendant had not fully served the aggregate sentence.
Key quotations
“We conclude, therefore, that the substitution of probation for special parole effectively has enlarged the defendant’s sentence by exposing him to incarceration for an additional ten year period in violation of his due process rights.” (429-30)
“It is well established that sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court cannot be bound by an agreement that removes that discretion.” (430-31)
“Accordingly, the defendant may be sentenced to a period of special parole unfettered by a mandatory minimum period, provided that the combination of the defendant’s term of incarceration and term of special parole does not exceed the statutory maximum set forth by § 54-128 (c).” (437-38)
“The fact that certain component parts of the total sentence had “expired” is irrelevant.” (445-46)
Factual background
Tabone entered an Alford plea to three sexual offenses involving a child. The trial court originally imposed an aggregate sentence of ten years of incarceration followed by ten years of special parole. After the Supreme Court held that sentence illegal, the trial court substituted ten years of probation for the special-parole term and relied on a state's attorney's agreement to seek only the remaining probationary period if probation were violated.
Procedural history
The defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to sexual assault in the second degree, sexual assault in the third degree, and risk of injury to a child. His original aggregate sentence was ten years of incarceration followed by ten years of special parole. In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court held that the sentence was illegal because the combined incarceration and special-parole terms exceeded the statutory maximum and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court imposed twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after ten years, followed by ten years of probation. The Supreme Court reversed that resentencing judgment and remanded for resentencing according to law.
Remand instructions
The trial court must resentence the defendant under the aggregate-package theory, within the original sentencing intent and statutory and constitutional limits. It may impose special parole without the ten-year mandatory minimum applicable under the former version of § 54-125e(c), provided the combined incarceration and special-parole terms do not exceed the statutory maximum and the revised aggregate sentence does not exceed the original sentence.