Summary
In this concurrence, Justice Espinosa agrees that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed but disagrees with the majority’s analysis of the combat-by-agreement jury instruction. The concurrence concludes that General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (3) categorically makes self-defense unavailable when physical force results from a combat by agreement, and that the trial court’s instruction improperly allowed self-defense under certain circumstances.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (3) categorically makes self-defense unavailable when the physical force involved was the product of a combat by agreement.
- Whether the trial court's instruction allowing self-defense if the victim violated the terms of an alleged combat agreement and escalated the force was legally correct.
- Whether any instructional error deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Holdings
- The concurrence would hold that the plain and unambiguous text of § 53a-19 (c) (3) categorically excludes self-defense as a justification when the physical force was the product of a combat by agreement, without an exception for escalation of force.
- The concurrence concludes that the instruction was incorrect because it permitted the defendant to rely on self-defense if the victim escalated the level of force beyond the alleged agreement.
- The concurrence agrees that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial and that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, because the erroneous instruction benefited rather than harmed the defendant by allowing her to rely on self-defense despite a finding of combat by agreement.
Key quotations
“The text does not provide for any exceptions to its rule that self-defense is unavailable to parties to a combat by agreement.”
“It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the legislature.”
Factual background
The case involved an altercation between the defendant and the victim. The defendant maintained that she had been assaulted and did not agree to fight, while evidence apparently supported an inference that the parties engaged in a combat by agreement, including testimony concerning a purported agreement to have a weaponless “fair one.” The concurrence reasoned that the statutory combat-by-agreement provision categorically precludes self-defense, regardless of whether one combatant escalates the level of force.
Procedural history
The defendant was convicted after a jury trial and challenged the trial court's instructions concerning subjective belief, combat by agreement, and self-defense. The concurrence joined the majority's conclusion that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, while disagreeing with the majority's analysis of the combat-by-agreement instruction.