State v. Stovall

State v. Stovall · Supreme Court of Connecticut · April 28, 2015

Summary

This is a dissenting opinion in State v. Stovall concerning whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant possessed crack cocaine with the intent to sell within 1,500 feet of a public housing project, in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b). Justice Espinosa concluded that the defendant’s repeated use of an apartment in the housing project to store drugs and drug-selling paraphernalia, together with other circumstantial evidence, supported the jury’s verdict. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence did not sufficiently connect the defendant’s intent to sell with the proscribed location.

Court
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Writing for the Court
Espinosa, J.
Jurisdiction
Connecticut
Decision date
April 28, 2015
Procedural posture
Criminal appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction for possessing narcotics with intent to sell within 1,500 feet of a public housing project.
Standard of review
The evidence is construed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and the reviewing court determines whether, on the facts so construed and the reasonable inferences drawn from them, the jury reasonably could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Precedential value
Dissenting opinion; nonbinding
Parties
Thomas Stovall v. State of Connecticut
Disposition
other

Topics

criminal procedureburden of proofmens reastatutory interpretationevidence

Practice areas

Criminal lawCriminal procedureEvidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed narcotics with the intent to sell them at a specific location within 1,500 feet of a public housing project.
  2. Whether proof of an actual or attempted sale within the proscribed area was necessary to establish the location-specific intent-to-sell element.

Holdings

  1. In the dissent's view, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to sell the crack cocaine within the public housing project.
  2. The dissent maintained that evidence of an actual or attempted sale is sufficient but not necessary to prove intent to sell at a particular proscribed location.

Key quotations

We have never, however, suggested that such evidence is necessary in order for the state to prove intent to sell narcotics at a particular location.
Neither the defendant nor the drugs were present in the apartment by chance—both were there by his arrangement.
The mere fact that the jury could have drawn different inferences does not call into question the sufficiency of the state’s evidence.

Factual background

The defendant used Librea Patrick's apartment in the Charles F. Greene Homes public housing project in Bridgeport as a place to store narcotics and drug-trafficking supplies. He paid Patrick $20 to $30 per month for closet storage and visited the apartment approximately two or three times per week; Patrick also saw him outside on the project grounds during the relevant period. A search conducted around midnight found thirteen bags of crack cocaine, sixteen cellular phones, packaging materials, cocaine residue, firearms, and other items in the apartment, while the defendant possessed $1,125 in mixed denominations.

Procedural history

The Appellate Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court majority disagreed, and Justice Espinosa dissented, asserting that the evidence was sufficient and that the Appellate Court properly resolved the issue.

Court Document

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