Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment upholding the trial court’s authority to authorize reasonable physical force to obtain a DNA sample from an incarcerated felon who refused to provide one. The court held that Connecticut General Statutes § 54-102g was regulatory rather than punitive and therefore did not violate due process or the federal Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to the defendant. It also concluded that the statute implicitly authorized the use of reasonable force before an express authorization was added by a 2011 amendment.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to authorize reasonable physical force to obtain a DNA sample from an incarcerated felon already serving sentences.
- Whether, before the 2011 amendment expressly authorizing reasonable force, § 54-102g implicitly authorized the use of reasonable physical force to obtain a DNA sample from a noncompliant inmate.
- Whether applying § 54-102g to a person convicted before the statute was expanded to cover all incarcerated felons violated the federal ex post facto clause.
- Whether applying § 54-102g to Banks violated due process.
Holdings
- The DNA-collection requirements of § 54-102g are regulatory rather than punitive in law or in fact. Because compliance does not affect the defendant's original sentence, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider and grant the state's motion for authorization to use reasonable force.
- Before the 2011 amendment expressly permitting reasonable force, § 54-102g implicitly authorized the use of reasonable physical force to obtain a DNA sample from an individual required to provide one who refused to comply.
- Applying § 54-102g to Banks did not violate the federal ex post facto clause because the statute is regulatory, not penal.
- Banks could not prevail on his due process claim because his due process concerns were premised on the statute's allegedly ex post facto and punitive character, which the court rejected.
Key quotations
“The critical question in determining whether a court may take action affecting a defendant’s sentence following its imposition is whether the requested action is punitive in nature.” (Part I.A)
“We agree with the Appellate Court’s determination that, prior to the 2011 amendment, the use of reasonable force to obtain a DNA sample from an unwilling individual was ‘‘inherent’’ in § 54-102g.” (Part I.B)
“As the regulatory nature of § 54-102g does not raise any concerns in regard to the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws, the defendant’s due process concerns stemming from the application of a supposed ex post facto law are therefore not an issue in the present case.” (Part II)
Factual background
Banks was convicted in 1997 of multiple robberies, kidnappings, and firearm-possession offenses and remained incarcerated. In 2009 and 2010, Department of Correction personnel directed him to provide a DNA sample under § 54-102g, but he repeatedly refused. The state sought and obtained a trial-court order authorizing reasonable physical force to collect the sample, and Banks was separately prosecuted and convicted for refusing to submit to DNA sampling.
Procedural history
The trial court authorized the state to use reasonable physical force to obtain a DNA sample from Banks after he refused repeated requests under General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 54-102g. Banks was subsequently convicted of refusing to submit to the taking of a biological sample for DNA analysis and received a consecutive one-year sentence. The Appellate Court consolidated his appeals and affirmed both judgments. The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed the Appellate Court.