Summary
This dissent addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Eddie A. Perez’s motions to sever two informations involving separate corruption-related offenses. The dissent argues that Perez did not make a sufficiently specific showing that he needed to testify in one case but remain silent in the other, and that the trial court appropriately granted alternative relief limiting cross-examination. The dissent would reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment and remand for consideration of the remaining appellate claims.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Perez's motion to sever two joined informations when he claimed that joinder interfered with his decision to testify in one case but remain silent in the other.
- Whether Perez made the required convincing showing of important testimony in one case and a strong need to refrain from testifying in the other.
- Whether the trial court's alternative relief permitting Perez to testify about the bribery charges without cross-examination concerning the extortion charges adequately mitigated any prejudice from joinder.
Holdings
- The dissent would hold that the trial court acted within its broad discretion in denying severance because Perez did not make a sufficient, specific showing in his first motion and did not demonstrate substantial prejudice after the trial court granted his requested alternative relief on his second motion.
Key quotations
“Deciding whether to sever two or more informations against a defendant that have been joined for a single trial calls for a trial court to exercise discretion and balance considerations of judicial economy against the likelihood that the joint trial will prejudice the defendant.”
“In considering whether to sever two cases that have been joined for trial, ‘‘the trial court enjoys broad discretion, which, in the absence of manifest abuse, an appellate court may not disturb.’’”
“A defendant seeking severance must do more than express a desire to testify in only one case.”
“To establish that he has important testimony to give, the defendant must show that his intended testimony credibly relates to the charges against him and will not be wholly cumulative of testimony available from other sources.”
“A ‘‘general statement’’ about the topics of the intended testimony is not enough.”
Factual background
Perez, the former mayor of Hartford, was charged in two informations with separate corruption-related offenses, one involving an alleged bribe and the other involving an alleged extortion attempt. The informations were joined for a single jury trial, and the trial court denied Perez's motions to sever. Perez sought severance because he wanted to testify in the bribery case but remain silent in the extortion case; the trial court ultimately permitted him to testify about the bribery charges without cross-examination concerning the extortion charges, but Perez chose not to testify.
Procedural history
The trial court joined two informations charging separate corruption-related offenses and denied Perez's motions to sever. Perez was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded for new, separate trials. This excerpt is a dissent from the Connecticut Supreme Court's disposition, arguing that the trial court acted within its discretion and that the Appellate Court's judgment should be reversed.
Remand instructions
The dissent would reverse the Appellate Court's judgment and remand the case to that court to consider Perez's remaining claims on appeal that it had not previously addressed.