Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the issuance of an arrest warrant within the applicable criminal statute of limitations commences a prosecution for limitations purposes only if the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay. The court further held that General Statutes § 54-193 (c), which tolls the limitations period for a person who has fled and resided outside Connecticut, applies only to the period within which a prosecution may be brought and does not extend the time for executing a warrant after prosecution has commenced. The court affirmed dismissal of the charge because the nearly five-year delay in executing the warrant was unreasonable.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 54-193 (c) tolls the criminal statute of limitations after an arrest warrant has already been issued within the limitations period.
- Whether the defendant’s relocation to California rendered § 54-193 (c) applicable despite the timely issuance of the arrest warrant.
- Whether the trial court properly dismissed the prosecution under State v. Crawford because the state executed the warrant after an unreasonable delay.
Holdings
- General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 54-193 (c) tolls only the period within which an indictment, information, or complaint may be brought; it does not apply to a prosecution already brought by issuance of an arrest warrant within the limitations period.
- The prosecution was time barred because the state conceded that the nearly five-year delay in executing the arrest warrant was unreasonable, and the defendant’s relocation did not excuse the state’s failure to act when his whereabouts were known.
Key quotations
“We conclude that § 54-193 (c) tolls the limitation period solely with respect to the time within which a prosecution may be brought and does not purport to address prosecutions that have already been brought, at which point, as the Appellate Court aptly determined in Roger B. v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 190 Conn. App. 838, there is no need for tolling because the statute of limitations has already been satisfied.” (at 838)
“What the state cannot do under our case law, however, is what the state did in the present case—obtain an arrest warrant within the limitation period and then wait nearly five years before attempting to serve it, knowing all along the defendant’s precise whereabouts.” (at 814)
Factual background
Police searched the defendant’s Connecticut residence in December 2009, seized his computers, and obtained a sworn statement in which he admitted possessing child pornography. The defendant moved to California in 2011, but maintained a readily ascertainable address and did not take evasive action; police obtained a warrant in May 2013 after a forensic report confirmed child pornography and knew the defendant’s location. Despite having his cell phone number and knowing where he lived, police made no effort to contact or arrest him until 2018, when the defendant was arrested nearly five years after issuance of the warrant and more than three years after expiration of the five-year limitations period.
Procedural history
The Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the information on statute-of-limitations grounds, concluding that the arrest warrant’s nearly five-year execution delay was unreasonable under State v. Crawford and that General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 54-193 (c) did not toll the limitations period after the warrant had issued. The court later granted the state’s motion for reargument but denied the requested relief. The state filed an amended appeal; the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which affirmed.