Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the medical-malpractice opinion-letter requirement in General Statutes § 52-190a does not implicate personal jurisdiction, overruling Morgan v. Hartford Hospital to that extent. The court clarified that challenges under § 52-190a are evaluated from the complaint and opinion letter, and that trial courts may permit amendment or supplementation of a deficient letter. The court further held that the complaint and attached materials adequately alleged that the opinion-letter author was a similar health care provider to the defendant dentist, and it reversed the dismissal of the action.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the written opinion letter required by General Statutes § 52-190a implicates a court’s personal jurisdiction.
- Whether the jurisdictional-fact procedures governing ordinary motions to dismiss apply to a § 52-190a motion to dismiss.
- Whether a court evaluating a § 52-190a motion to dismiss may consider affidavits or other evidence outside the complaint and the attached opinion letter.
- Whether the complaint and opinion letter adequately established that Solomon was a similar health care provider to Daar under General Statutes § 52-184c (c).
Holdings
- The opinion-letter requirement in General Statutes § 52-190a is a unique statutory procedural device and does not implicate a court’s personal jurisdiction. Morgan v. Hartford Hospital is overruled to the extent it held otherwise.
- The ordinary rules governing pleading and proof of jurisdictional facts under Practice Book §§ 10-30 and 10-31 and Conboy v. State do not apply to a motion to dismiss under § 52-190a. The inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint and the face of the opinion letter, and courts may permit amendment or supplementation of a defective letter in response to the motion.
- The complaint and attached opinion letter adequately established that Solomon was a similar health care provider to Daar under General Statutes § 52-184c (c). A broad and realistic reading of the pleadings supported the allegation that Daar held himself out as a practitioner or specialist in endodontics.
Key quotations
“We now hold that the opinion letter requirement is a unique, statutory procedural device that does not implicate the court’s jurisdiction in any way.” (Opinion introduction)
“By elevating the opinion letter to a jurisdictional prerequisite of any kind, it allows a potential prelitigation defect to defeat a medical malpractice action that a jury has deemed meritorious after several years of litigation.” (Opinion section I C)
Factual background
Carpenter alleged that dentist Bradley Daar negligently failed to diagnose and treat an infection during a June 16, 2015 root-canal procedure, causing serious infection, hospitalization, surgery, and continuing dental treatment. The complaint alleged that Daar held himself out as a practitioner or specialist in endodontics based on Shoreline’s website, which described his extensive endodontic training. Carpenter attached an opinion letter from Charles S. Solomon, a board-certified endodontist and professor of endodontics, asserting that Solomon was a similar health care provider. Daar submitted an affidavit stating that he was a general dentist who performed the procedure in that capacity.
Procedural history
Carpenter sued Daar and Shoreline Modern Dental, LLC, alleging negligent failure to diagnose and treat an infection during root-canal surgery. The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the opinion letter did not establish that its author was a similar health care provider. The Appellate Court affirmed, relying in part on Morgan v. Hartford Hospital and treating the opinion-letter requirement as implicating personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Connecticut granted certification, overruled Morgan in part, and reversed with directions for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
Reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand to that court with direction to reverse the Superior Court’s judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court with direction to deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss and conduct further proceedings according to law.