Summary
This Connecticut Supreme Court opinion addresses whether labeling someone a 'white supremacist' on social media constitutes actionable defamation per se or nonactionable opinion under the state's anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the term, without more, is inherently subjective and not objectively verifiable, thus constituting protected opinion. Consequently, the trial court properly granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss and awarded attorney's fees.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Murphy waived any challenge to Rosen's initial showing under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute that the complaint arose from protected speech concerning a matter of public concern.
- Whether characterizing someone as a "white supremacist," without more, is an objectively verifiable fact or a nonactionable opinion for purposes of defamation per se.
- Whether Rosen's statements necessarily implied undisclosed defamatory facts in the context of the Facebook exchange.
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying reconsideration.
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Rosen attorney's fees and costs under General Statutes § 52-196a (f) (1).
Holdings
- Murphy expressly waived any claim that Rosen failed to establish under General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3) that the complaint was based on her exercise of protected free speech concerning a matter of public concern.
- The bald characterization of a person as a "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than an objectively verifiable fact constituting defamation per se.
- In this case, Rosen's use of the term "white supremacist" did not necessarily imply that she knew undisclosed defamatory facts or had private, firsthand knowledge about Murphy.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Rosen attorney's fees and costs under General Statutes § 52-196a (f) (1).
Key quotations
“We conclude that, although calling someone a ‘‘white supremacist’’ or a ‘‘racist’’ is a serious accusation, the meanings of these terms are inherently subjective.” (122)
“We agree that characterizing someone as a ‘‘white supremacist,’’ without more, is a matter of personal opinion rather than a fact that can be verified by this court.” (136)
“Under these circumstances, a reasonable reader would not have expected the defendant to be stating a fact about the plaintiff.” (138)
“Reading the Facebook post and comments in their entirety and in context, however, we agree with the trial court that the language the defendant used is merely expressive rhetoric meant to convey her opinion of the plaintiff’s political views, not an attempt to assert factual allegations related to the plaintiff’s conduct or to imply undisclosed facts.” (142)
Factual background
During a heated Facebook discussion concerning racial injustice, George Floyd's killing, and local political issues, Murphy and Rosen exchanged derogatory and politically charged comments. In response to Murphy's demand that another commenter provide details supporting accusations of racism, Rosen called Murphy a "troll and a white supremacist" and later stated that the burden of proof that he was not a white supremacist was on him. The discussion was public, involved extensive name-calling, and did not identify specific wrongful conduct or a particular hate-group affiliation by Murphy.
Procedural history
Murphy sued Rosen in the Superior Court for defamation per se based on her social-media characterization of him as a white supremacist. The trial court granted Rosen's special motion to dismiss under General Statutes § 52-196a, denied Murphy's motion for reconsideration, and awarded Rosen $38,023.63 in attorney's fees and costs under § 52-196a (f) (1). Murphy appealed to the Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court transferred the appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.