Derwin Dewayne Bell v. the State of Texas

Summary

The Ninth Court of Appeals of Texas at Beaumont reviews Derwin Dewayne Bell’s convictions for possession of methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine with intent to deliver. Bell challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence and argued that the jury charge improperly omitted a requirement concerning federal registration or exemption. The court concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient and that the jury charge was not erroneous, and it affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Holdings

1. Heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine are controlled substances in Penalty Group 1 by statutory definition, and the substances' penalty-group classification is a question of law rather than a fact the State was required to separately prove to the jury.
2. The evidence was legally sufficient to establish Bell's possession of the controlled substances because the cumulative force of the affirmative links connected him to the drugs in the vehicle and at the Fadal residence.
3. The State was not required to plead or prove that Bell was not registered with or exempt from registration with the DEA, or that the section 481.062 exceptions did not apply. Those matters are defensive issues on which Bell bore the burden of producing evidence, and the trial court did not err by omitting unrequested instructions because Bell offered no such evidence and did not object or request an instruction.

Questions Presented

1. Whether legally sufficient evidence supported Bell's convictions because the State allegedly failed to establish that the substances were in Penalty Group 1.
2. Whether legally sufficient evidence supported a finding that Bell possessed the controlled substances.
3. Whether the State was required to prove that Bell was not registered with or exempt from registration with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, or that the exceptions in Texas Health and Safety Code section 481.062 did not apply.
4. Whether the jury charge was erroneous because it did not require the jury to find that Bell was not registered or exempt from registration with the DEA and did not include the statutory presumption concerning the absence of a registration or order form.

Disposition

affirmed