Jonekia Scott, Mariah Scott, and Christopher Scott v. Alamo Title Insurance Company

No. 02-25-00340-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 22, 2026) · Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth · January 22, 2026 · No. No. 02-25-00340-CV

Summary

The Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District of Texas dismissed the Scotts’ appeal for want of jurisdiction after the trial court set aside the final judgment being appealed. The court concluded that the appeal was moot as to the vacated judgment and premature as to interlocutory rulings not incorporated into a new final judgment.

Court
Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth
Writing for the Court
Bonnie Sudderth; Bonnie Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr, J.; Birdwell, J.
Jurisdiction
Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth
Decision date
January 22, 2026
Docket number
No. 02-25-00340-CV
Procedural posture
Appeal from a final judgment that the trial court set aside within forty-eight hours after signing it; appellee moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Standard of review
De novo review of appellate jurisdiction; an appellate court must determine its jurisdiction before reaching the merits.
Precedential value
published
Parties
Jonekia Scott, Mariah Scott, Christopher Scott v. Alamo Title Insurance Company
Disposition
dismissed

Topics

mootnessappellate jurisdictionfinal judgment ruleinterlocutory appealappellate procedure

Practice areas

appellate procedurecivil procedureinsurance

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the court of appeals retained jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment that the trial court set aside after the notice of appeal was filed.
  2. Whether the appeal was moot because the appealed-from judgment had been vacated.
  3. Whether any challenge to interlocutory rulings was premature because no new final judgment or appealable interlocutory order existed.

Holdings

  1. The court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because the trial court had set aside the appealed-from final judgment.
  2. The appeal was moot to the extent it challenged the vacated final judgment.
  3. Any challenge to interlocutory rulings was premature because the rulings had not been incorporated into a new final judgment and no appealable interlocutory order remained.

Key quotations

Because the trial court set aside the appealed-from final judgment, the Scotts’ appeal is (1) moot to the extent that it seeks to challenge that judgment, (2) premature to the extent that it seeks to challenge interlocutory rulings not yet cemented in a new final judgment, or (3) both.
Whatever the case may be, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.

Factual background

The trial court signed a final judgment in the underlying case and then set that judgment aside within forty-eight hours. The appellants had filed a notice of appeal before the judgment was set aside. After the judgment was vacated, no operative final judgment remained for review, and any interlocutory rulings had not been incorporated into a new final judgment.

Procedural history

The County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County signed a final judgment. Within forty-eight hours, the trial court set that judgment aside under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d) and (e). The appellants had already filed a notice of appeal, and the appellee moved to dismiss. The court of appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the challenged judgment had been vacated and any challenge to unresolved interlocutory rulings was premature.

Court Document

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