Summary
The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas considers the University of Texas at Arlington's interlocutory appeal from the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction in Julie Shaw's Chapter 21 race-discrimination lawsuit. The court holds that Shaw presented no direct evidence of discriminatory intent and failed to raise a fact issue that UTA's stated work-performance reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court reverses the trial court's ruling and renders judgment for UTA.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Brown's statements constituted direct evidence of discriminatory intent under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code.
- Whether Shaw created a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework after UTA produced legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination.
- Whether UTA's plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted because Shaw failed to provide evidence sufficient to support Chapter 21's waiver of sovereign immunity.
Holdings
- The statements did not constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent because they were not related to the termination decision, were not sufficiently close in time to it, and, for the statements concerning Black executive assistants, required an inference or presumption to connect them to race.
- UTA satisfied its burden of production by presenting legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Shaw, including documented work-performance concerns, and it was not limited to the explanation contained in Shaw's boilerplate termination letter.
- Shaw failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that UTA's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were false or a pretext for race discrimination.
- UTA was immune from suit because Shaw failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish a Chapter 21 violation and therefore failed to support Chapter 21's waiver of sovereign immunity.
Key quotations
“Chapter 21 provides one such waiver, “but only if the plaintiff alleges facts that would establish that the state agency violated [Chapter 21] and, when challenged with contrary evidence, provides evidence that is at least sufficient to create a genuine fact issue material to that allegation.”” (at 9-10)
““[R]ather, the issue is whether the employer’s perception of h[er] performance, accurate or not, was the real reason for h[er] termination.”” (at 21-22)
“UTA was immune from suit absent some evidence that it violated Chapter 21, and Shaw presented no such evidence.” (at 24-25)
Factual background
Shaw, a white executive assistant at UTA, worked under Provost Tamara Brown, who is Black, and was terminated in October 2023. UTA attributed the termination to documented work-performance problems involving scheduling, faculty hiring plans, a tenure review, and the STARs funding process. Shaw alleged that Brown's conduct and several race-related statements showed that she was fired because she was white, but the court concluded that the statements were not sufficiently connected to the termination and that Shaw produced no evidence that UTA's stated reasons were pretextual.
Procedural history
Shaw sued UTA under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code, alleging that UTA fired her because she was white. UTA filed a plea to the jurisdiction combined with a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Shaw lacked evidence supporting Chapter 21's waiver of sovereign immunity because she could not establish discriminatory intent or pretext. The 96th District Court of Tarrant County denied the plea without specifying its basis. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.
Remand instructions
The court reversed the trial court's order and rendered judgment dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. No remand to the lower court was ordered; the disposition category reflects the reversal and rendition of judgment.