Shequita Truitt, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of G.M.T., a Minor v. Bryan Winder and Dwayne R. McConnell

Summary

This memorandum opinion and order addresses Defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 50 or, alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59. The underlying wrongful-death action arose from the death of a nine-year-old child after she entered a roadway and was struck by a vehicle. The court considers issues including duty and proximate cause, comparative negligence, conscious pain and suffering damages, and alleged improper closing argument.

Holdings

1. Winder owed G.M.T. a legal duty arising from his responsibility for her care and supervision, although the scope of that duty could vary depending on whether the alleged conduct involved misfeasance or nonfeasance.
2. The evidence provided a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that Winder's conduct was a proximate cause of G.M.T.'s death, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
3. The court declined to disturb the jury's finding that G.M.T. was not comparatively negligent. A child's maturity, capacity, understanding of danger, familiarity with the surroundings, and the circumstances of the accident are ordinarily factual questions for the jury.
4. The estate did not present a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the $350,000 conscious-pain-and-suffering award. The award was vacated under Rule 50, and alternatively the verdict was not one a reasonably prudent jury could have reached under Rule 59.
5. The alleged improper vouching and closing-argument statements did not warrant a new trial because they did not so inflame or corrupt the jury that the verdict was irretrievably tainted under Rule 59.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Winder owed G.M.T. a legal duty based on his responsibility for her care and supervision.
2. Whether sufficient evidence supported a finding that Winder's conduct was a proximate cause of G.M.T.'s death despite G.M.T.'s conduct and McConnell's negligence.
3. Whether G.M.T.'s comparative negligence was established as a matter of law or whether the jury's finding of no comparative negligence should be disturbed.
4. Whether the evidence legally supported the jury's $350,000 award for G.M.T.'s conscious pain and suffering.
5. Whether alleged improper vouching and appeals to passion or prejudice during closing argument required a new trial.
6. Whether the medical-expense and mental-anguish damages should be disturbed.

Disposition

other