Summary
The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed Freddy Flonnory's direct appeal from convictions and a death sentence for murder and related offenses. The court held that improper extraneous communications and prejudicial information reached the jury, creating presumptive prejudice and violating Flonnory's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. The judgments of the Superior Court were reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
Holdings
- Communication of highly prejudicial, improper, and inadmissible information about Flonnory's alleged prior murder involvement to jurors outside the courtroom violated his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution.
- When a defendant proves a reasonable probability of juror taint arising from egregious circumstances that are inherently prejudicial, prejudice is presumed and the defendant need not prove actual prejudice.
- Actual prejudice was independently established when a juror testified that the improperly communicated information about Flonnory's alleged prior murder involvement affected her vote to convict him of first-degree murder.
- Once the guilt phase had concluded and the court learned that the jury had deliberated with inherently prejudicial extraneous information, manifest necessity required a mistrial; the trial court erred by denying Flonnory's mistrial motion and proceeding to the penalty phase.
Questions Presented
- Whether extraneous, highly prejudicial information that Flonnory had previously been accused of murder was improperly communicated to the jury outside the courtroom and violated his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.
- Whether the circumstances established a presumption of prejudice under Delaware's egregious-circumstances test for juror taint.
- Whether the sworn testimony that the extraneous information affected one juror's vote established actual prejudice.
- Whether the trial court was required to declare a mistrial after learning that the jury had deliberated with the prejudicial information.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (20)
- Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 151-56 (1968)(followed)
- Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965)(followed)
- Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959)(followed)
- Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1046-47 (Del. 1985)(followed)
- Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257-59 (Del. 1988)(followed)
- Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 894-97 (Del. 1987)(followed)
- McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915)(followed)
- Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892)(followed)
- Diaz v. State, 743 A.2d 1166, 1180 (Del. 1999)(followed by analogy)
- Smith v. State, 317 A.2d 20, 23 (Del. 1974)(followed)
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Court Document
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