Summary
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the defendant's absence when counsel agreed to an Allen charge and when the charge was given violated Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 43. The court concluded that the defendant neither personally waived the right to be present nor authorized counsel to waive it, and that the absence was prejudicial. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial on the counts of conviction, while barring retrial on the count resulting in acquittal.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether giving an Allen charge while the defendant was absent constituted a violation of Superior Court Criminal Rule 43.
- Whether the defendant personally waived his Rule 43 right to be present by being absent for approximately fifteen minutes during jury deliberations.
- Whether defense counsel had authority to waive the defendant's personal right to be present and to agree to the Allen charge without the defendant's participation.
- Whether the defendant was prejudiced by his absence when the decision to give the Allen charge was made and when the charge was delivered.
- Whether a new trial could be ordered on the count of third-degree rape on which the jury acquitted the defendant.
Holdings
- The giving of an Allen charge is a stage of trial under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 43, and the defendant therefore had a right to be present both when the court decided to give the charge and when the charge was delivered.
- Bradshaw did not voluntarily waive his Rule 43 right to be present by being absent for approximately fifteen minutes during jury deliberations.
- Defense counsel could not waive Bradshaw's personal right to be present under the circumstances by agreeing to the State's request for an Allen charge without Bradshaw's authority or participation.
- Bradshaw was prejudiced by both his inability to consult with counsel about whether to request or resist the Allen charge and his absence while the charge was delivered to the jury.
- The new trial was limited to the one count of third-degree rape and one count of second-degree unlawful sexual contact on which Bradshaw was convicted; he could not be retried on the third-degree rape count on which he was acquitted.
Key quotations
“We hold that the absence of the defendant was a violation of the right granted by Rule 43 of the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure to be present "at every stage of the trial...."” (at 132-133)
“It is sufficient to say that she did not wait long enough in this case.” (at 137)
“Accordingly, we conclude that his absence at this stage was inherently prejudicial.” (at 140)
“Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for a new trial on one charge of third degree rape and one charge of second degree unlawful sexual contact.” (at 140)
Factual background
The State charged Bradshaw with two counts of third-degree rape and one count of second-degree unlawful sexual contact arising from an alleged sexual encounter with a twelve-year-old girl at a Days Inn hotel. After approximately a day of deliberations, the jury informed the trial court that it could not reach a decision. Bradshaw was briefly absent from the courtroom, and, after a short search, his counsel agreed to the State's request for an Allen charge; the charge was then given while Bradshaw remained absent. The jury later acquitted Bradshaw of one rape count but convicted him of the other rape count and the unlawful-sexual-contact count.
Procedural history
Bradshaw was tried before a jury in the Delaware Superior Court on two counts of third-degree rape and one count of second-degree unlawful sexual contact. The jury acquitted him of one rape count but convicted him of the other rape count and the unlawful-sexual-contact count. The Delaware Supreme Court held that his absence during the decision to give and the delivery of the Allen charge violated Superior Court Criminal Rule 43, was not waived by him or his counsel, and was prejudicial; it reversed and remanded for a new trial on the two counts resulting in convictions.
Remand instructions
Reverse the Superior Court judgment and conduct a new trial on one count of third-degree rape and one count of second-degree unlawful sexual contact. Bradshaw may not be retried on the third-degree rape count on which he was acquitted.