Summary
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a jury verdict for the defendant and ordering a new trial in an automobile personal-injury action. The court concluded that whether the vehicle driver was the defendant's agent was a factual question that the jury could reasonably resolve against the plaintiff, and that improper defense-counsel comments about damages did not prejudice the liability determination. The court vacated the new-trial order, subsequent rulings, and second jury verdict, and remanded for reinstatement of the original verdict and entry of judgment for Lang.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by setting aside the first jury verdict and ordering a new trial on the ground that Lang's control over the driver established an agency relationship as a matter of law.
- Whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial sua sponte based on improper defense counsel comments concerning Morant's credibility and damages.
- Whether the first jury's finding that no agency relationship existed was supported by evidence sufficient to require deference to the jury.
Holdings
- The existence of an agency relationship between an automobile owner and driver depends on factual elements, principally ownership and control, and ordinarily is a question for the factfinder. Lang's presence in the vehicle, ownership of it, consent to the driver's conduct, and the shared social trip did not make agency indisputable as a matter of law.
- The Superior Court abused its discretion by setting aside the first jury's finding that no agency relationship existed because the evidence did not preponderate so heavily against the verdict that no reasonable jury could have reached it.
- Although defense counsel's comments concerning the credibility of Morant and his medical experts were improper, they did not warrant setting aside the verdict because they addressed damages rather than the agency issue, and the jury never reached damages after finding no agency.
Key quotations
“Where the evidence is susceptible to two equally reasonable conclusions, state constitutional policy favoring jury determination of the facts and this Court's precedent both demand a jury, rather than a judicial, resolution.” (187)
“Ultimately, however, we must conclude that the trial judge's original instinct to send the agency question to the jury was correct.” (187)
Factual background
In April 1997, Raymond Morant's vehicle collided with the rear of a vehicle owned by Danielle Lang and driven by an unidentified person known as Lewis. Lang, Lewis, and another person had driven to a fast-food restaurant, picked up an additional passenger, and were traveling on the highway when the collision occurred. Morant sued Lang, alleging negligent entrustment and later agency-based vicarious liability. At the first trial, the jury found that Lewis was not Lang's agent and returned a verdict for Lang.
Procedural history
Morant sued Lang in the Superior Court for injuries arising from a collision involving Lang's vehicle, initially alleging negligent entrustment and later proceeding on an agency theory. The first jury found no agency relationship and returned a verdict for Lang. The trial judge set aside that verdict, ordered a new trial, later granted Morant summary judgment on liability, and the second jury awarded Morant $25,000 in damages. The Supreme Court vacated the new-trial order, all subsequent rulings, and the second verdict, and remanded for reinstatement of the original verdict and entry of judgment for Lang.
Remand instructions
Vacate the Superior Court judgment ordering a new trial, all subsequent rulings, and the second jury verdict. Reinstate the original jury verdict and enter judgment in favor of Lang. Jurisdiction is not retained.