Summary
The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed Norman's consolidated direct and automatic appeals from convictions for first-degree murder and related offenses. The court held that a psychiatric examination arranged in violation of Norman's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was nevertheless admissible under the independent-source and inevitable-discovery exceptions. It affirmed the convictions but reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty hearing because the jury was not instructed to consider Norman's alleged lack of criminal responsibility under Maryland law as a mitigating circumstance.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the State violated Norman's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by participating in a Maryland psychiatric examination after Delaware charges had been filed, and whether the resulting psychiatric evidence was admissible.
- Whether Delaware may use an unadjudicated homicide occurring in Maryland to establish the statutory aggravating circumstance that the defendant's course of conduct resulted in the deaths of two or more persons.
- Whether Delaware's multiple-death course-of-conduct aggravator was vague or overbroad as applied to Norman.
- Whether collateral estoppel barred Delaware from using the Maryland homicide because Maryland prosecutors dismissed the Maryland charges.
- Whether Norman's lack of criminal responsibility under Maryland law was a mitigating circumstance that the capital sentencer was required to consider and whether the failure to instruct the jury on Maryland law required a new penalty hearing.
Holdings
- The State violated Norman's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it participated in obtaining Dr. Mechanick's initial psychiatric evaluation after Delaware proceedings had commenced, but the evaluation and testimony were admissible under the independent-source and inevitable-discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
- Delaware may use evidence of criminal conduct occurring in another state, including an unadjudicated Maryland homicide, to establish the statutory aggravating circumstance that the defendant's course of conduct resulted in the deaths of two or more persons, provided the aggravating circumstance is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)k is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as applied to Norman.
- Collateral estoppel did not bar Delaware from using the Maryland homicide as an aggravating circumstance because the Maryland dismissal did not constitute a final adjudication on the merits resolving Norman's criminal responsibility.
- When the State uses unadjudicated criminal conduct in another jurisdiction to establish a capital aggravating circumstance, the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility under that jurisdiction's law is a relevant mitigating circumstance that the jury and judge must consider. The failure to instruct the jury on the applicable Maryland law required reversal of the death sentence and a new penalty hearing.
Key quotations
“Lack of criminal responsibility under the law of the state where an act occurs is a mitigating circumstance.” (847-848)
“The rule, however, is not a blanket prohibition on admissibility: statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment are nonetheless admissible if certain exceptions apply.” (858)
“The absence of any guidance on Maryland law relating to Norman's lack of criminal responsibility for his conduct in Maryland made it impossible for the jury either to decide the existence of a critical mitigating circumstance relied upon by the defense or to weigh that circumstance in the determination of sentence.” (872)
Factual background
On April 7, 2005, Norman engaged in a shooting spree across Delaware and Maryland, killing Jamell Weston in Delaware and Davondale Peters in Maryland and wounding several other people. The defense presented psychiatric evidence that Norman was experiencing a psychotic episode and lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Maryland prosecutors dismissed the Maryland charges, while Delaware prosecutors used Peters's death as part of the statutory aggravating circumstance supporting a capital sentence.
Procedural history
Norman was convicted in the Delaware Superior Court of first-degree murder and related offenses after the jury rejected not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity and guilty-but-mentally-ill verdicts. The jury and trial judge found a statutory aggravating circumstance based on Norman's causing the deaths of two persons, one in Delaware and one in Maryland, and imposed a death sentence. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the convictions, but reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty hearing because the jury and judge were not instructed on Maryland law governing Norman's claimed lack of criminal responsibility for the Maryland homicide.
Remand instructions
Affirm the judgments of conviction, reverse the death sentence, and conduct a new penalty hearing. The new hearing must include an instruction to the jury on the applicable Maryland law governing whether Norman lacked criminal responsibility for the Maryland homicide and other Maryland conduct offered in aggravation.