Allison v. State

Allison v. State · Supreme Court of the State of Delaware · September 28, 2016 · No. No. 661, 2015

Summary

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Mubrouca Allison’s convictions for two counts of endangering the welfare of a child after she left her young children unattended in a vehicle during extreme heat. The Court held that Delaware’s child-endangerment statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied, that the charging information provided adequate notice, and that the State presented sufficient evidence of potential physical or mental harm. The decision was issued by order per curiam on September 28, 2016.

Court
Supreme Court of the State of Delaware
Writing for the Court
Strine, Chief Justice; Valihura, Justice; Seitz, Justice
Jurisdiction
Delaware
Decision date
September 28, 2016
Docket number
No. 661, 2015
Procedural posture
Appeal from a Superior Court judgment entered after a jury convicted Allison of two counts of endangering the welfare of a child.
Standard of review
Constitutional and legal claims are reviewed de novo. Because Allison did not object to the information before trial, the challenge to its form was waived and, even if considered, was reviewed for plain error.
Precedential value
Published Delaware Supreme Court order; precedential status is indicated by the supplied metadata.
Parties
Mubrouca Allison v. State of Delaware
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal procedurevoid for vaguenessappellate procedurepreservation of errorstatutory interpretation

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedureconstitutional lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Delaware's child-endangerment statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Allison's conduct.
  2. Whether the Superior Court plainly erred by permitting the State to proceed on an information that allegedly failed to provide adequate notice of the charges.
  3. Whether the information and trial evidence were insufficient because the State did not specify or prove whether the potential harm was physical, mental, or moral.

Holdings

  1. The statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied because an ordinary person could understand that leaving two young children unattended in an unlocked car in near-triple-digit heat, with inadequate ventilation, was likely to injure their physical, mental, or moral welfare. Expert testimony was unnecessary to establish that understanding.
  2. The challenge to the form of the information was waived because Allison did not object before trial. In any event, the information was adequate because it tracked the statutory language and tied that language to the specific conduct of leaving the child unattended in a vehicle; therefore, allowing the State to proceed on the information was not plain error.
  3. The State was not required to specify whether the potential injury was physical, mental, or moral. The information was sufficient if it alleged any one of the three statutory forms of harm, and the evidence was sufficient because the children's potential dehydration, overheating, distress, and crying supported potential physical and mental harm.

Key quotations

We find Allison’s constitutional vagueness argument to be without merit because an ordinary person could easily understand that leaving two young children alone in an unlocked car in near triple-digit heat for at least fifteen minutes with the windows almost rolled up could be “injurious to the physical, mental, or moral welfare” of the children. (4)
An information is adequate if it is “a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” (5)
Also, it is sufficient if the information covers any one of the three harms covered by the statute. (6)

Factual background

On July 2, 2014, Allison left her six-year-old and one-year-old children unattended in an unlocked, non-running car in a grocery-store parking lot during extremely hot and humid weather. The outside temperature was approximately 98 degrees, the windows were open only a few inches, and the children were crying, sweating, and distressed; the younger child had vomited. Emergency personnel removed the children from the car, and Allison was later convicted of two counts of endangering the welfare of a child.

Procedural history

Allison was initially convicted by a Family Court Commissioner of criminal impersonation and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child; the Family Court affirmed. On appeal to the Superior Court for a trial de novo, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the criminal impersonation charge, and a Superior Court jury convicted Allison of two counts of child endangerment. The Superior Court imposed concurrent thirty-day Level V sentences, suspended for one year of Level II probation. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.

Court Document

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