Summary
Affirming probate of a contested will, the court held that the 2002 amendment to Fla. Stat. § 733.107(2) makes the presumption of undue influence a policy-based presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the will’s proponent to prove the nonexistence of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence. The amendment supersedes prior case law (Carpenter and Cripe) to the extent it prohibited burden shifting, but the circumstances giving rise to the presumption remain unchanged. The trial court’s finding that the proponent rebutted the presumption was supported by competent substantial evidence.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court's findings that Helling was competent and not unduly influenced were supported by competent substantial evidence.
- Whether the trial court correctly applied the burden of proof under the revised undue influence statute, § 733.107, Florida Statutes (2002).
- What quantum of proof is required for a will proponent to overcome the presumption of undue influence.
Holdings
- The 2002 amendment to § 733.107, adding subsection (2), made the presumption of undue influence a policy-based shifting of the burden of proof under §§ 90.301-90.304, requiring the proponent of the will to prove the nonexistence of undue influence once the contestant establishes a prima facie case.
- The proponent must prove the nonexistence of undue influence by the preponderance (greater weight) of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.
- The trial court's findings were affirmed as supported by competent substantial evidence.
Key quotations
“The 2002 amendment to section 733.107, adding subsection 2, was intended to incorporate sections 90.301-90.304 of the Florida Evidence Code, and require a shifting of the burden of proof after the presumption of undue influence arises in a will contest.” (443)
“[T]he trier of fact determines the question of undue influence by the preponderance (greater weight) of the evidence.” (444)
“The presumption of undue influence implements public policy against abuse of fiduciary or confidential relationships and is therefore a presumption shifting the burden of proof under sections 90.301-90.304.” (442-43)
Factual background
Dorothy T. Helling executed a will in 1990 and a later will in 1992. After her death, the 1992 will was offered for probate by Lorraine Janes, who was a substantial beneficiary and served as personal representative. Appellants, beneficiaries under the 1990 will, challenged the 1992 will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by Janes, who had a confidential relationship with Helling. At the first trial, the court directed a verdict for Janes, but the appellate court reversed, finding a prima facie case of undue influence. At retrial, the court heard conflicting evidence and found Helling competent and no undue influence.
Procedural history
Appellants, beneficiaries under 1990 will, challenged probate of 1992 will on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. At first trial, trial court granted directed verdict for proponent, but on appeal, the Fifth District reversed, finding prima facie case of undue influence. On retrial, trial court again admitted 1992 will, concluding testator was competent and no undue influence. This appeal followed.