Summary
The Supreme Court of Florida held that a nonresident defendant need not be physically present in Florida to commit a tortious act under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida's long-arm statute. Telephonic, electronic, or written communications directed into Florida may constitute such an act when the alleged cause of action arises from those communications. The court quashed the Fifth District's decision to the extent it required physical presence and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the complaint stated a cause of action arising from the communications.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a nonresident defendant can commit a tortious act in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), through telephonic, electronic, or written communications sent into Florida from outside the state.
- Whether physical presence in Florida is required to establish that a nonresident defendant committed a tortious act in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b).
Holdings
- A nonresident defendant may commit a tortious act in Florida through telephonic, electronic, or written communications sent into Florida, provided that the alleged cause of action arises from those communications.
- The court did not decide whether personal jurisdiction was actually established over Horowitz or his law firm; the lower court must first determine whether the complaint states a cause of action and, if so, whether the cause of action arises from the communications into Florida.
Key quotations
“For the reasons that follow, we hold that "committing a tortious act" within Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur by making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into this State, provided that the tort alleged arises from such communications.” (822 So. 2d at 1253)
“First, in order to "commit a tortious act" in Florida, a defendant's physical presence is not required. Second, "committing a tortious act" in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. However, the cause of action must arise from the communications.” (822 So. 2d at 1260)
Factual background
K.D. Trinh Investments, a Canadian corporation, raised capital through short-term, high-interest loans made primarily by Florida residents. Horowitz, a Michigan attorney retained as outside counsel, drafted and revised loan documents for use with Florida investors and communicated by telephone and mail with Florida brokers, investigators, and Wendt concerning the company's notes and securities investigations. Wendt alleged that he relied to his detriment on Horowitz's legal advice and asserted tort-based claims supporting personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute.
Procedural history
Wendt filed an amended third-party complaint against Horowitz and his law firm and alleged that Florida courts had personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(f)(1), Florida Statutes. The trial court denied Horowitz's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Fifth District reversed, holding that jurisdiction was improper under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (1)(b). The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review based on an asserted express and direct conflict and quashed the Fifth District's decision in part, remanding for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The lower court was to determine whether the complaint stated a cause of action and, if so, whether the alleged cause of action arose from the telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida.