Pace v. State

854 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2003) · Supreme Court of Florida · May 22, 2003 · No. Nos. SC01-1831, SC02-519

Summary

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Bruce Douglas Pace’s appeal from the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Pace alleged ineffective assistance of guilt- and penalty-phase counsel, Brady violations, constitutional defects under Ring v. Arizona, and denial of access to public records. The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied the habeas petition.

Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the Court
Per Curiam; Wells, J.; Pariente, J.; Lewis, J.; Quince, J.; Cantero, J.; Shaw, Senior Justice
Jurisdiction
Florida
Decision date
May 22, 2003
Docket number
Nos. SC01-1831, SC02-519
Procedural posture
Pace appealed the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief and separately petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus.
Standard of review
The performance and prejudice prongs of an ineffective-assistance claim are mixed questions of law and fact reviewed de novo, while the postconviction court's factual findings, including credibility determinations and evidentiary weight, receive deference and are upheld if supported by competent, substantial evidence. The legal question of prejudice under Brady is reviewed de novo, with deference to factual findings.
Precedential value
Published Florida Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Bruce Douglas Pace v. State of Florida
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

post-conviction reliefhabeas corpusineffective assistancesentencingevidence

Practice areas

criminal lawpost-conviction capital litigationhabeas corpusineffective assistance of counselcriminal evidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether penalty-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of Pace's crack addiction, obtain an adequate mental-health evaluation, secure a neuropsychological examination, and present evidence of a difficult childhood.
  2. Whether guilt-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to present voluntary-intoxication or insanity defenses based on Pace's crack use.
  3. Whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose a fingerprint-smudge report and a written reprimand of Investigator Jean Shirah.
  4. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial comments concerning Pace's silence.
  5. Whether Ring v. Arizona rendered Florida's capital-sentencing scheme or Pace's death sentence unconstitutional.
  6. Whether Pace was denied access to public records.
  7. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the CCP instruction, the avoid-arrest aggravator instruction, and admission of Pace's pants.
  8. Whether the Supreme Court of Florida failed to conduct proportionality review on direct appeal.

Holdings

  1. Pace failed to establish ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel because the record supported the finding that counsel reasonably investigated mitigation, relied on unfavorable expert opinions and Pace's own statements, and made reasonable strategic decisions not to present crack-use evidence, seek additional experts, obtain a neuropsychologist, or present additional childhood evidence.
  2. Pace failed to establish ineffective assistance of guilt-phase counsel based on counsel's failure to present voluntary-intoxication or insanity defenses.
  3. The State's failure to disclose the fingerprint-smudge report did not violate Brady because Pace failed to show that the report was sufficiently favorable or material to undermine confidence in the verdict.
  4. Pace failed to establish a Brady violation based on the written reprimand of Investigator Shirah.
  5. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's comments because, viewed in context, the comments addressed inconsistencies in Pace's hypothesis of innocence and prearrest conduct rather than his failure to testify.
  6. Ring v. Arizona did not entitle Pace to postconviction or habeas relief under the Florida Supreme Court's then-existing precedents.
  7. Pace waived or abandoned his public-records claim by failing to pursue or renew the claim during the year and a half between his request and the evidentiary hearing.
  8. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the CCP instruction or the avoid-arrest aggravator instruction.
  9. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge admission of the pants because the evidence was sufficiently authenticated and the proposed appellate issue lacked merit.
  10. Pace's claim that the Florida Supreme Court failed to conduct proportionality review was meritless because the direct-appeal decision expressly concluded that death was the appropriate penalty and relied on comparable capital cases.

Key quotations

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. (172)
The question regarding whether prejudice ensued (also referred to as whether the evidence is material) "is whether `the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (178)

Factual background

Investigators found Covington's bloodstained taxicab and later recovered Covington's body, which had been shot twice with a shotgun. Evidence at trial linked Pace to the crime, including testimony placing him in the cab, bloodstains consistent with Covington's blood type on his clothing, his fingerprint on the cab, possession of the suspected murder weapon, and shotgun shells found near his stepfather's home. A jury convicted Pace of first-degree murder and armed robbery and recommended death, and the trial court imposed a death sentence based on three aggravating circumstances.

Procedural history

Pace was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The circuit court later denied Pace's amended Rule 3.850 motion after summarily denying some claims and holding an evidentiary hearing on others. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed that denial and denied Pace's habeas petition.

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