Gamble v. State

877 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2004) · Supreme Court of Florida · May 6, 2004 · No. Nos. SC02-195, SC02-1948

Summary

The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of Guy Richard Gamble's motion for post-conviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court rejected claims involving ineffective assistance of counsel, concessions during opening and penalty-phase arguments, counsel's inexperience, the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator, and alleged Nelson, Faretta, Apprendi, and Ring violations.

Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the Court
Per Curiam; Wells, J.; Pariente, J.; Lewis, J.; Quince, J.; Cantero, J.; Bell, J.; Anstead, C.J.
Jurisdiction
Florida
Decision date
May 6, 2004
Docket number
Nos. SC02-195, SC02-1948
Procedural posture
Gamble appealed the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief and separately petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus.
Standard of review
Ineffective-assistance claims are reviewed under Strickland v. Washington, requiring deficient performance and prejudice. Post-conviction factual findings are supported when competent, substantial evidence supports them. Claims conclusively refuted by the record may be summarily denied.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Guy Richard Gamble v. State of Florida, James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

state post-conviction reliefhabeas corpusineffective assistancecompetency to be executedsentencing

Practice areas

criminal lawcapital post-conviction litigationhabeas corpusineffective assistance of counsel

Questions Presented

  1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a constitutional challenge to the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating-circumstance instruction.
  2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective under Nixon v. Singletary and United States v. Cronic for conceding lesser-degree guilt in opening statement.
  3. Whether penalty-phase counsel was ineffective under Nixon and Cronic for conceding the pecuniary-gain aggravating circumstance.
  4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective because of inexperience, workload, or inadequate preparation.
  5. Whether the trial court was required to conduct a Nelson inquiry concerning counsel's alleged incompetence and a Faretta inquiry concerning self-representation.
  6. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Nelson and Faretta issues.
  7. Whether Florida's capital-sentencing scheme violated Apprendi v. New Jersey or Ring v. Arizona.
  8. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective concerning the alleged disproportionality between Gamble's sentence and his codefendant's sentence.
  9. Whether Gamble's claim that he might be incompetent at execution was ripe for review before issuance of a death warrant.

Holdings

  1. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the standard cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating-circumstance instruction because the instruction had not been invalidated when Gamble was tried and counsel was not required to anticipate the later development of the law. Any challenge to the application of the aggravator was also procedurally barred because it had been raised and considered on direct appeal.
  2. Counsel's opening-statement concession that Gamble was guilty of a lesser-degree murder offense did not constitute per se ineffective assistance or deficient performance under Strickland, Nixon, or Cronic.
  3. Counsel was not ineffective for conceding the pecuniary-gain aggravating circumstance during the penalty phase when the factual basis for that aggravator had already been established by the jury's guilt-phase verdicts.
  4. General allegations that counsel was inexperienced, overburdened, or inadequately prepared did not establish ineffective assistance under Strickland.
  5. No Nelson inquiry was required because Gamble alleged only a speculative potential conflict and did not identify counsel incompetence or an actual adverse effect on representation. No Faretta inquiry was required because Gamble never requested to represent himself.
  6. Gamble's death sentence was not invalid under Apprendi or Ring. Ring did not require notice of aggravating factors in the indictment or a special verdict form, and the jury's guilty verdicts for first-degree murder and armed robbery established a statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.
  7. A claim that a defendant may be incompetent to be executed is not ripe for review until the Governor signs a death warrant.

Key quotations

Sometimes concession of guilt to some of the prosecutor's claims is good trial strategy and within defense counsel's discretion in order to gain credibility and acceptance of the jury. (714)
A possible, speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is "insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." (718)

Factual background

On December 10, 1991, Guy Richard Gamble and Michael Love killed their landlord, Helmut Kuehl, by striking him with a claw hammer and choking him with a cord. They stole Kuehl's car and wallet, and Gamble forged and cashed a blank check found in the wallet for $8,544. Gamble was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and first-degree murder and received a death sentence.

Procedural history

Gamble was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions and sentence on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Gamble later filed a Rule 3.850 motion, which the trial court denied after granting an evidentiary hearing on several claims and summarily denying others. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief and denied habeas relief.

Court Document

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