Summary
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of Anthony Farina's motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court rejected claims involving newly discovered evidence based on his codefendant's life sentence, allegedly exculpatory witness testimony, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Jeffrey Farina's subsequent reduction from a death sentence to life imprisonment constituted newly discovered evidence requiring a new sentencing proceeding for Anthony.
- Whether testimony from Jeffrey Farina, family members, and a psychologist constituted newly discovered evidence that would probably produce an acquittal or life sentence on retrial.
- Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present additional evidence of Jeffrey's aggression, dominance, and control over Anthony.
- Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor's use of biblical authority during cross-examination and closing argument.
- Whether the prosecutor's religious references constituted fundamental error despite the lack of a preserved objection.
Holdings
- A codefendant's subsequent life sentence did not warrant postconviction relief because Jeffrey's sentence was reduced solely because he was legally ineligible for the death penalty due to his age, not because the aggravating and mitigating circumstances supported a life sentence. The sentence therefore would not probably result in a life sentence for Anthony on retrial.
- The testimony of Jeffrey Farina, Susan Griffith, Katrina Bergenty, and Dr. Clifford Levin did not warrant relief because the circuit court properly found the evidence incredible in light of the victims' contrary testimony, and competent substantial evidence supported those credibility findings.
- Trial counsel was not ineffective because much of the omitted evidence was cumulative of mitigation evidence presented at resentencing, and the remaining evidence did not establish a reasonable probability of a different sentencing result.
- Appellate counsel was not ineffective because the prosecutorial-misconduct claim was not preserved: defense counsel objected only on relevance grounds, did not assert prosecutorial misconduct, and did not obtain a ruling or renew the objection.
- The prosecutor's use of biblical references during cross-examination and the ambiguous allusion during closing argument, although improper and conduct that should have been avoided, did not constitute fundamental error because the death recommendation could have been reached without the challenged conduct and the conduct did not undermine the foundation or validity of the sentencing proceeding.
Key quotations
“Thus, to succeed on a claim that a death sentence must be set aside because of a codefendant's subsequent life sentence the defendant must show: "1) the life sentence could not have been known to the parties ... at the time of trial; and 2) the codefendant's life sentence would probably result in a life sentence for the defendant on retrial."” (619)
“"Fundamental error" is the sole exception to the preservation requirement.” (629)
“The prosecutor should have refrained from this type of conduct. However, his behavior falls short of fundamental error.” (632)
Factual background
Anthony and his brother Jeffrey confronted employees outside a Taco Bell after closing, forced several employees inside, took the day's receipts, restrained the employees, and placed them in a walk-in freezer. Jeffrey shot three employees and Anthony stabbed another; one victim later died. Anthony was convicted of first-degree murder and received a death sentence after a resentencing proceeding in which the jury unanimously recommended death.
Procedural history
Farina was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after a resentencing proceeding. The Supreme Court of Florida previously vacated his original death sentence because a qualified prospective juror had been improperly excused, but later affirmed the death sentence imposed after resentencing. The circuit court denied Farina's Rule 3.851 postconviction motion, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed that denial while denying his habeas petition.