Raleigh v. State

932 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2006) · Supreme Court of Florida · June 1, 2006 · No. Nos. SC03-710, SC03-2282

Summary

The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of Bobby Raleigh's motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court rejected claims involving inadequate mental-health assistance, ineffective assistance of counsel, admission of a codefendant's statement, alleged Giglio violations, inconsistent prosecution theories, and the retroactive application of Ring v. Arizona.

Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the Court
Per Curiam; Pariente, C.J.; Wells, J.; Anstead, J.; Lewis, J.; Quince, J.; Cantero, J.; Bell, J.
Jurisdiction
Florida
Decision date
June 1, 2006
Docket number
Nos. SC03-710, SC03-2282
Procedural posture
Raleigh appealed the circuit court's denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 motion for postconviction relief and separately petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus.
Standard of review
The court deferred to the trial court's factual findings concerning credibility and the weight of evidence, independently reviewed whether the facts established the elements of the constitutional claims, and reviewed the performance and prejudice prongs of ineffective-assistance claims de novo. The court reviewed the Ake-related factual findings for competent, substantial evidence.
Precedential value
Published opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida; precedential within Florida.
Parties
Bobby Raleigh v. State of Florida
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

state post-conviction reliefhabeas corpusineffective assistancesentencingdue process

Practice areas

criminal procedurecapital postconviction litigationhabeas corpusineffective assistance of counselconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Raleigh's mental-health evaluation was constitutionally inadequate under Ake v. Oklahoma and sufficiently deficient to warrant postconviction relief.
  2. Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by inadequately preparing the mental-health expert's testimony.
  3. Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to, or by opening the door to, admission of Figueroa's entire taped statement.
  4. Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by recommending that Raleigh plead guilty to two counts of first-degree murder based on the later decision in Delgado v. State.
  5. Whether the State knowingly presented false testimony in violation of Giglio v. United States.
  6. Whether the State violated due process by taking inconsistent positions concerning the principal actor in Eberlin's murder under Bradshaw v. Stumpf.
  7. Whether Florida's capital-sentencing scheme was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona.

Holdings

  1. Postconviction relief was not warranted because Raleigh failed to show that the mental-health evaluation was so grossly insufficient that it ignored clear indications of mental retardation or organic brain damage.
  2. Raleigh failed to establish ineffective assistance because, even assuming deficient performance, he did not prove prejudice.
  3. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to admission of the entire statement because the objection would have been meritless under the doctrine of completeness, and counsel's decision to introduce portions of the statement was a reasonable strategic decision.
  4. Raleigh could not establish ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to anticipate Delgado because Delgado did not apply retroactively to convictions that were already final.
  5. Raleigh failed to establish a Giglio violation because he did not show that Figueroa's statement to investigator Horzepa was false or that the State knew it was false.
  6. The State did not violate due process because it consistently argued in both trials that Raleigh was a principal actor in Eberlin's murder; its argument at Figueroa's trial that Figueroa was also culpable was not materially inconsistent with its position at Raleigh's proceeding.
  7. Raleigh was not entitled to habeas relief based on Apprendi or Ring because Ring does not apply retroactively to cases that were final on review.

Key quotations

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's conclusions that Dr. Upson did not miss signs of mental retardation or organic brain damage and that Raleigh in fact received a professional, competent, and appropriate mental health evaluation for use in aid of his defense. (932 So. 2d at 1062)
Therefore, the due process concerns raised in Stumpf do not apply. (932 So. 2d at 1067)

Factual background

Raleigh and Domingo Figueroa confronted Douglas Cox after a dispute at a bar, obtained guns, entered Cox's trailer, and shot Cox and his roommate, Tim Eberlin. Raleigh later admitted killing both men in a taped statement to police. He pleaded guilty to two first-degree murder counts, and the State dismissed burglary and shooting-into-a-building charges. At the penalty phase, defense counsel presented mental-health testimony and portions of Figueroa's recorded statement; Raleigh was sentenced to death after the jury unanimously recommended death on both counts.

Procedural history

Raleigh pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder in exchange for dismissal of burglary and shooting-into-a-building charges and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed his sentences on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. After an evidentiary hearing on several postconviction claims, the circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed that denial and denied Raleigh's habeas petition.

Remand instructions

The circuit court's denial of postconviction relief was affirmed, and Raleigh's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. No remand was ordered.

Court Document

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